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THE “TUNISIAN” SPRING: WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN TUNISIA
AND BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR FEMINISM IN
NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST
John Hursh*
I.

INTRODUCTION

More than six years have passed since the tumultuous weeks that
comprised the key moments of the Arab Spring.1 Although initially
greeted with great optimism, most results of these remarkable events
ultimately have been discouraging.2 In Egypt, a “democratic coup
*

1.

2.

LL.M., McGill University Faculty of Law; J.D., Indiana University Maurer School
of Law. I would like to thank the University of Baltimore School of Law and the
Center on Applied Feminism for inviting me to its outstanding Feminist Legal
Theory Conference in 2016. I would also like to thank all the students and staff at
the University of Baltimore Law Review for greatly improving this article since its
initial submission. Special thanks goes to Managing Editor Emily Steiner for truly
exceptional editing and to Articles Editor Stanley Carignan for deftly moving this
article through the production process and for his great patience with the author.
Finally, I dedicate this article to all the brave feminists and activists that continue to
fight for gender equality throughout the world. Salam.
See Lin Noueihed, Peddler’s Martyrdom Launched Tunisia’s Revolution, REUTERS
(Jan. 19, 2011, 11:29 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-tunisia-protests-bouaziziidUKTRE70I7TV20110119. Most accounts of the Arab Spring mark December 17,
2010 as the starting point, when local protestors gathered in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia
following Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation. See id. (“It began with a slap and
an insult hurled at a vegetable seller in a small town surrounded by scrub and cactus.
It ended with a revolution that has shaken authoritarian leaders across the Arab
world.”). Bouazizi, a fruit seller, committed this act after a humiliating encounter
with local authorities that encapsulated the feeling of helplessness that many
Tunisians, particularly the marginalized youth, felt during President Ben Ali’s
corrupt and repressive rule. See id. This feeling resonated throughout much of the
Arab world, where protesters, often led by frustrated youth, rebelled against
similarly corrupt and authoritarian regimes. See, e.g., Kareem Fahim, Slap to a
Man’s Pride Set Off Tumult in Tunisia, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/world/africa/22sidi.html (“The revolution has
rippled beyond Tunisia, shaking other authoritarian Arab states, whose frustrated
young people are often written off as complacent when faced with stifling
bureaucracy and an impenetrable and intimidating security apparatus.”).
See, e.g., Robin Yassin-Kassab et al., ‘I Was Terribly Wrong’ - Writers Look Back at
the Arab Spring Five Years on, GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2016, 2:30 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/jan/23/arab-spring-five-years-on-writerslook-back (demonstrating the contrast between Arab writers’ initial positive
reactions to the Arab Spring and their reactions five years later).
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d’état” paved the way for the resignation of longtime authoritarian
leader Hosni Mubarak and, eventually, democratic elections.3
However, this moment of hope and reform proved to be short-lived.
The elected president and Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed
Morsi proved to be so divisive and consolidated executive authority
to such an alarming extent that General Abdel Sisi replaced him in a
military, if arguably popularly supported, coup.4 Egypt is now
perhaps even more authoritarian and less free than it was under
President Mubarak,5 and as President Sisi’s popularity continues to
wane, many commentators argue that Egypt’s “deep state” remains in
control of the country despite the 2011 revolution or 2013 coup.6
Likewise, little has changed in Morocco, where after widespread
protests and a promising youth-led grassroots initiative (the February
20th Movement),7 the majority of Moroccans eventually stood pat
3.
4.

5.

6.

7.

See Ozan O. Varol, The Democratic Coup d’État, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 291, 356
(2012).
See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Egypt Erupts in Jubilation as Mubarak Steps Down,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/world/middleeast/12egypt.html (detailing
President Hosni Mubarak’s resignation); David D. Kirkpatrick, Named Egypt’s
Winner, Islamist Makes History, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/world/middleeast/mohamed-morsi-of-muslimbrotherhood-declared-as-egypts-president.html (assessing Mohamed Morsi’s
successful presidential campaign in 2012); Sisi Takes Power in Egypt, AL JAZEERA
(June 8, 2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/sisi-be-swornas-egypt-president-20146843619902534.html (discussing General Sisi’s assumption
of power after deposing President Morsi).
Worse than Mubarak, ECONOMIST (May 2, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21650160-abdel-fattah-alsisi-has-restored-order-egypt-great-cost-worse (“But [Sisi’s] authoritarian habits
leave Egypt looking a lot as it did before the Arab spring, when Mr. Mubarak,
another military man, ruled with an iron first. The repression is even worse now, say
many.”).
Heba Saleh, Sisi Loses His Lustre as Discontent Grows in Egypt, FIN. TIMES (Apr.
21, 2016, 1:46 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5528ce9e-0799-11e6-9b510fb5e65703ce.html#axzz4ErqGlfnu (statement of Osama al-Ghazali Harb,
Democratic Front Party) (“Sisi has become less popular with time because it has
been demonstrated that those who really rule in Egypt now are the agencies of the
deep state—security organs and the bureaucracy.”).
Adria Lawrence, The Mixed Record of Morocco’s February 20 Protest Movement,
WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Feb. 20, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/20/the-mixedrecord-of-moroccos-february-20-protest-movement/ (“The biggest winner of the
Moroccan Arab Spring was the monarchy itself . . . . The February 20th movement’s
objective—a monarch constrained by democratic procedures—has not been
achieved. Instead, the king paid lip service to democratic aspirations while quietly
shutting down critical voices.”); Ilhem Rachidi, Inside the Movement: What Is Left of
Morocco’s February 20?, MIDDLE EAST EYE (Feb. 26, 2015, 6:32 PM),
http://www.middleeasteye.net/in-depth/features/what-left-morocco-s-february-20-
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when King Mohammed VI made largely superficial democratic
reforms.8
Perhaps most distressing, violence has increased significantly.9
After the removal of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya remains a violent
state with two parallel governments.10 Yemen also remains ensnarled
in violence, which escalated significantly in 2015 due to Saudi
Arabia’s intervention, turning an already protracted internal conflict
into a regional one.11 Finally, the civil war in Syria continues to

8.

9.

10.

11.

movement-857852436 (“[D]espite constitutional reforms announced in the aftermath
of the first 2011 protests and hailed by the international community, most activists
say they feel no real political progress has been made.”).
Marina Ottaway, The New Moroccan Constitution: Real Change or More of the
Same?, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (June 20, 2011),
http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/06/20/new-moroccan-constitution-real-changeor-more-of-same-pub-44731 (“A large number of interviews during a recent trip to
Morocco suggest that the king may well have succeeded in staying ahead of the
protest that has led to the demise of the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt and plunged
Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain into turmoil and violence.”); see also Aidan
Lewis, Why Has Morocco’s King Survived the Arab Spring?, BBC NEWS (Nov. 24,
2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-15856989 (explaining how the
majority allowed King Mohammed VI to remain in power despite the protests and
grassroots movements).
See generally MOHAMED DAADAOUI, MOROCCAN
MONARCHY AND THE ISLAMIST CHALLENGE: MAINTAINING MAKHZEN POWER (2011)
(providing a strong socio-institutional explanation for the monarchy’s ability to
remain in power and withstand opposition through its appropriation and
manipulation of traditional cultural and religious symbols and practices).
See, e.g., Greg Botelho, Arab Spring Aftermath: Revolutions Give Way to Violence,
More Unrest, CNN (Mar. 28, 2015, 1:52 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/27/middleeast/arab-spring-aftermath/. In addition to
violence and armed conflict, women and girls living within Arab countries have
faced additional violence linked to the Arab Spring. See RACHEL KEAN,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY MEETING SUMMARY: THE RISE OF VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN AND GIRLS SINCE THE ARAB SPRING 4 (2014),
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20140
610RiseViolenceAgainstWomenArabSpring.pdf (noting that women and girls face
new forms of violence “intrinsically linked to the political uprisings of the Arab
Spring – women’s ‘bodies are battlefields’ and are being instrumentalized in political
rivalries”).
Leila Fadel, Libya Today: 2 Governments, Many Militias, Infinite Chaos, NPR (Feb.
6, 2015, 1:49 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/02/06/384277648/libya-today-twogovernments-many-militias-infinite-chaos; see also Agence France-Presse, Libya
Conflict: UN Says All Sides Probably Guilty of War Crimes, GUARDIAN (Feb. 25,
2016, 3:36 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/25/libya-conflict-unsays-all-sides-are-probably-guilty-of-war-crimes (“All sides in the Libyan conflict
are probably guilty of war crimes, including torturing, raping and executing
prisoners . . . .”).
Yemen: Crisis Overview, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR COORDINATION HUMANITARIAN
AFF., http://www.unocha.org/yemen/crisis-overview (last visited Dec. 19, 2016)
(noting that since the March 2015 escalation of an already protracted conflict,
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show few signs of abetting. The conflict already has claimed the
lives of perhaps 400,000 people,12 led to an overwhelming refugee
and migrant crisis,13 and provided fertile ground for the Islamic State
to take root.14

12.
13.

14.

government and opposition forces had killed 6,500 people (an average of 113
causalities per day) and injured more than 31,400, while an estimated 14.4 million
people cannot meet their food needs and 7.6 million are “severely food insecure”);
see also Laura Kasinof, How Yemen’s Civil Conflict Turned into a Regional Proxy
War, NATION (May 4, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-yemens-civilconflict-turned-regional-proxy-war/ (“The conflict in Yemen is not rooted in a
regional conflict. . . . [I]t has become a part of a bigger regional war that is not just
about Yemen.”); Jim Michaels, Yemen Fighting Grows into Regional Conflict, USA
TODAY (Mar. 26, 2015, 7:54 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/03/26/tikrity-shiite-iran-saudiarabia-yemen/70505808/ (“Sectarian fighting escalated dramatically in Yemen
Thursday, as an unfolding civil war began to look more like a regional conflict
between Sunni-led Saudi Arabia and Shiite power Iran.”); Yemen: The Forgotten
War, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/yemen-theforgotten-war/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (“On 25 March 2015, an international
coalition led by Saudi Arabia launched air strikes against the Huthi armed
group . . . . [T]he conflict has spread and fighting has engulfed the entire country.
Horrific human rights abuses, as well as war crimes, are being committed throughout
the country causing unbearable suffering for civilians.”).
Syria Death Toll: UN Envoy Estimates 400,000 Killed, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 23, 2016),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/staffan-de-mistura-400000-killed-syriacivil-war-160423055735629.html.
Syria Regional Refugee Response, UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES,
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php (last updated Oct. 23, 2016) (noting
that there are nearly 4.8 million registered Syrian refugees); see also Syria’s Refugee
Crisis in Numbers, AMNESTY INT’L (Feb. 3, 2016, 7:02 PM),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/02/syrias-refugee-crisis-in-numbers/.
See Philip Issa, Syrian Civil War: Five Ways the Conflict Has Changed the World,
INDEPENDENT (Mar. 13, 2016, 3:44 PM),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syrian-civil-war-isis-how-itchanged-the-world-refugee-crisis-a6928796.html (“It was in the vacuum of the
deteriorating Syria conflict that a little-known and terrifically violent branch of alQaeda grew into the foremost terror group on the planet.”); Loveday Morris, In
Syrian Civil War, Emergence of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Boosts Rival Jabhat
al-Nusra, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-syrian-civil-war-emergenceof-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-syria-boosts-rival-jabhat-alnusra/2013/10/25/12250760-3b4b-11e3-b0e7-716179a2c2c7_story.html. In 2016,
Ennahda found that it had outgrown its Islamist origins and the party now identifies
as “Muslim democrats.” Rached Ghannouchi, From Political Islam to Muslim
Democracy: The Ennahda Party and the Future of Tunisia, 95 FOREIGN AFF. 58, 58
(2016). Noting that Islamic values still guide the party’s actions, Ennahda no longer
feels under threat from authoritarian dictators that previously denied its participation
in the political process. Id. at 59. As such, Ennahda can function as a political party
rather than as the social movement from which it began. As Ghannouchi stated:
“Tunisia is finally a democracy rather than a dictatorship; that means that Ennahda
can finally be a political party focusing on its practical agenda and economic vision
rather than a social movement fighting against repression and dictatorship.” Id. at
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In the midst of this authoritarianism, chaos, and bloodshed, Tunisia
has emerged as a largely free and open society.15 Tunisia’s
successful transition from authoritarian kleptocracy to democratic
state received further validation when Tunisia’s National Dialogue
Quartet received the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize.16 A crucial aspect of
Tunisia’s transition from revolution to an emergent, if fragile,
democracy was the success of women’s rights activists in shaping
this process. These activists worked tirelessly to ensure that
women’s rights remained strong both through their participation in
civil society and by safeguarding these rights in Tunisia’s legal
system.17 Indeed, Tunisian feminists and women’s rights activists
succeeded not only in joining the protests that forced President Zine
al-Abidine Ben Ali to flee the country, but also in remaining an
active part of civil society and the National Dialogue.18 Their most

15.

16.

17.

18.

60. Although a significant change worth noting, this Article discusses Ennahda
through 2015, when the party still identified as an Islamist party.
Sebastian Fagan, Tunisia Declared Free by Freedom House, TUNIS. LIVE (Feb. 11,
2015), http://www.tunisia-live.net/2015/02/11/tunisia-declared-free-by-freedomhouse/ (“Tunisia was singled out as an example of a successful democracy in a
region which has seen continuing state suppression and human rights abuses.”); Arch
Puddington, Discarding Democracy: A Return to the Iron Fist, in FREEDOM HOUSE,
FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2015 (2015),
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/01152015_FIW_2015_final.pdf
(“Tunisia’s . . . status improved from Partly Free to Free due to the adoption of a
progressive constitution, governance improvements under a consensus-based
caretaker administration, and the holding of free and fair parliamentary and
presidential elections, all with a high degree of transparency.”).
Julian Borger et al., Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet Wins 2015 Nobel Peace
Prize, GUARDIAN (Oct. 9, 2015, 11:04 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/09/tunisian-national-dialogue-quartetwins-2015-nobel-peace-prize; The Nobel Peace Prize for 2015, NOBELPRIZE.ORG
(Oct. 10, 2015),
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2015/press.html.
See UN Women Applauds the Decision to Award the Nobel Peace Prize to the
Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet, UN WOMEN (Oct. 9, 2015),
http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2015/10/statement-on-nobel-peace-prizeto-the-tunisian-national-dialogue-quartet (“[T]he remarkable strides in Tunisia’s
democratic transition, including the adoption of the Constitution in 2014 . . . were
due in large part to the extensive consultations with civil society including women
from diverse backgrounds and segments of Tunisian society.”).
Hayat Alvi, Women’s Rights Movements in the ‘Arab Spring’: Major Victories or
Failures for Human Rights?, 16 J. INT’L WOMEN’S STUD. 294, 307 (2015) (“Women
took part in the Tunisian revolution of 2011, and played significant roles in the
activism that helped end decades of authoritarianism.”); Mounira M. Charrad &
Amina Zarrugh, The Arab Spring and Women’s Rights in Tunisia, E-INT’L REL.
(Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.e-ir.info/2013/09/04/the-arab-spring-and-womens-rightsin-tunisia/ (“At the heart of this burgeoning civil society and activism following the
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significant legal victory was including an article guaranteeing gender
equality within Tunisia’s 2014 post-revolution constitution, despite
initially strong opposition from conservative actors and reluctance
from Ennahda, the Islamist party then controlling parliament.19 Just
as importantly, women’s rights activists maintained their ability to
participate in public discourse and the political process that shaped
Tunisia’s mostly peaceful transition, as the country moved from
authoritarian regime to a surprisingly inclusive democracy.20
In this regard, Tunisia can be viewed as a state moving toward the
gender inclusive society reflected in the canonical texts of Islamic
feminism.21 Scholars such as Leila Ahmed, Fatima Mernissi, Amina
Wadud, Asma Barlas, among many others, have long rejected that
Islam is incompatible with women’s rights.22 Rather, they find that
deep-seated patriarchal traditions have usurped the ethos of gender
equality present within Islamic thought.23 At the same time, scholars
such as Abdullahi An-Na‘im argue that a secular state is necessary
for Islam,24 while contemporary writers such as Mona Eltahawy find
that the Middle East requires a sexual revolution before women will
find equality and escape patriarchy and oppression.25 The Tunisian

19.
20.
21.

22.

23.
24.
25.

Jasmine Revolution is the historical status of Tunisia as the bulwark of women’s
rights in the region.”).
See infra Section IV.B(3)(c)(ii).
Alvi, supra note 18, at 305–06 (noting that “[i]n Tunisia, women freely occupy the
public space” and that an August 2012 rally saw thousands protest against possible
constitutional changes that would have threatened gender equality).
See, e.g., Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Towards Gender Equality: Muslim Family Laws and
the Shari‘ah, in WANTED: EQUALITY AND JUSTICE IN THE MUSLIM FAMILY 23, 42
(Zainah Anwar ed., 2009); Ziba Mir-Hosseini, The Construction of Gender in
Islamic Legal Thought and Strategies for Reform, 1 HAWWA: J. WOMEN MIDDLE E.
& ISLAMIC WORLD 1, 4 (2003) (“The further fiqh texts are removed from the time
and the spirit of revelation, the stronger becomes their patriarchal voice.”).
See LEILA AHMED, WOMEN AND GENDER IN ISLAM: HISTORICAL ROOTS OF A MODERN
DEBATE 11 (1992); FATIMA MERNISSI, BEYOND THE VEIL: MALE-FEMALE DYNAMICS
IN MODERN MUSLIM SOCIETY 19 (Ind. Univ. Press rev. ed. 1987) (1975); FATIMA
MERNISSI, THE VEIL AND THE MALE ELITE: A FEMINIST INTERPRETATION OF WOMEN’S
RIGHTS IN ISLAM 10–11 (Mary Jo Lakeland trans., Addison-Wesley Publ’g Co. 1991)
(1987); AMINA WADUD, INSIDE THE GENDER JIHAD: WOMEN’S REFORM IN ISLAM 2
(2006); AMINA WADUD, QUR’AN AND WOMAN: REREADING THE SACRED TEXT FROM
A WOMAN’S PERSPECTIVE 1 (Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1999) (1992); ASMA BARLAS,
“BELIEVING WOMEN” IN ISLAM: UNREADING PATRIARCHAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
QUR’AN 2 (2002).
See infra Section III.A.
ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA‘IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE: NEGOTIATING THE
FUTURE OF SHARI‘A 1 (2008) (“In order to be a Muslim by conviction and free
choice, which is the only way one can be a Muslim, I need a secular state.”).
MONA ELTAHAWY, HEADSCARVES AND HYMENS: WHY THE MIDDLE EAST NEEDS A
SEXUAL REVOLUTION 31 (2015) (“The battles over women’s bodies can be won only
by a revolution of the mind.”).
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experience reflects aspects of these diverse perspectives, although
secular feminism maintains the strongest presence in Tunisian social
discourse, politics, and law.
This Article examines women’s rights in Tunisia after more than
six years since a popular uprising forced longtime autocrat Ben Ali to
flee the country, which allowed Tunisian democracy to begin to take
hold. Further, it explores what, if any, broader implications Tunisia’s
women’s rights movement has for other states in North Africa or the
Middle East. Part II reconsiders the Arab Spring through a critical
perspective, while also assessing how Tunisian exceptionalism and
the Islamist Ennahda party situate Tunisia in this larger dynamic.26
Part III discusses Islamic feminism and examines how this innovative
school of thought contributes to the struggle for advancing women’s
rights and achieving gender equality throughout Islamic and Muslim
majority states.27 Finally, Part IV explores women’s rights in
Tunisia, both before and after the 2010–2011 revolution, and assesses
how these rights relate to Tunisia’s legal tradition, historical legacy,
and significant legal developments that occurred after the
revolution.28
II. RECONSIDERING THE ARAB SPRING
Few, if any, expected the Arab Spring.29 Western analysts and host
country observers alike failed to predict the civil protests and popular
uprisings that commentators quickly characterized as the Arab
Spring.30 Most accounts mark the beginning of the Arab Spring as
December 18, 2010, when protests broke out after the selfimmolation of Tunisian street vender Mohamed Bouazizi.31
Bouazizi’s self-immolation followed years of harassment and abuse

26.
27.
28.
29.

30.

31.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See, e.g., F. Gregory Gause III, Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring:
The Myth of Authoritarian Stability, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 81, 81 (2011) (“The vast
majority of academic specialists on the Arab world were as surprised as everyone
else by the upheavals that toppled two Arab leaders last winter and that now threaten
several others.”).
See Jeff Goodwin, Why We Were Surprised (Again) by the Arab Spring, 17 SWISS
POL. SCI. REV. 452, 452 (2011) (“[N]o social scientist or political analyst in either
the West or the Arab world itself claims to have predicted these uprisings, so far as I
am aware. Nor did any Western or Arab intelligence agency predict them. In fact,
the very people who participated in these uprisings, including long-time activists, do
not seem to have foreseen them.”).
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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from local authorities, a pattern repeated throughout Tunisia during
President Ben Ali’s authoritarian and highly corrupt rule.32
Within Tunisia, popular protests spread quickly, and Ben Ali fled
to Saudi Arabia to escape the collapse of his rule.33 Following this
dramatic departure, a caretaker national government assumed the
daily activities of the state before holding elections on October 23,
2011.34 The formerly banned Ennahda (Renaissance) party won the
largest share of seats in the National Constituent Assembly,35 which
held the responsibility of drafting Tunisia’s post-revolutionary
constitution.36 Drafting and implementing a new constitution was the
foremost priority for the newly elected government, although this
process proved much more difficult and time-consuming than
anticipated.37
By 2013, social and political tensions were extremely high, as
Tunisia’s nascent democracy appeared on the verge of collapse.38
The constitution remained incomplete, as Ennahda and rival parties
struggled to resolve strong differences on key legal issues.39 A
stagnant economy and general feeling that democracy could not
address the fundamental socioeconomic issues at the heart of the
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

37.

38.

39.

See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
Tunisia: Ex-President Ben Ali Flees to Saudi Arabia, BBC NEWS (Jan. 15, 2011),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12198106.
Tunisia’s Interim Government Delays Election, BBC NEWS (June 8, 2011),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-13702372; see also Tunisia: ExPresident Ben Ali Flees to Saudi Arabia, supra note 33.
See Ennahda Wins Tunisia’s Elections, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 28, 2011),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/10/2011102721287933474.html.
Tunisia Constituent Body Holds First Session, AL JAZEERA (Nov. 22, 2011),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/11/2011112217751533504.html (“The
politicians, who will be entrusted with drafting a new constitution and paving the
way for fresh elections, sang the national anthem as the session got under way in the
Bardo palace, on the outskirts of Tunis.”).
Tunisia Begins Landmark Debate on Draft Constitution, NAHARNET (July 1, 2013,
8:43 AM), http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/88921 (“Tunisia’s first parliamentary
debate on the draft constitution was suspended on Monday amid chaotic scenes in
the National Assembly, with tensions between the ruling Islamists and their
opponents flaring over the long-delayed text.”). In addition to disagreements over
the constitutional text, the drafters struggled even to agree upon the political system
that the constitution would serve. Id. (“The main political parties were originally
given a year to draft the text after the first post-revolution elections in October 2011,
but the timetable was repeatedly revised amid disagreement about the nature of
Tunisia’s future political system.”).
See Ridha Kéfi, Tunisia: Civil Society, the Driving Force Behind the Democratic
Transition, in IEMED MEDITERRANEAN YEARBOOK 2015 237, 239 (2015),
http://www.iemed.org/observatori/arees-danalisi/arxiusadjunts/anuari/med.2015/IEMed%20Yearbook%202015_Panorama_TunisiaDemocr
aticalTransition_RidhaKefi.pdf.
See id.
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revolution contributed to this crisis.40 These factors, alongside a rise
in religious extremism and the assassinations of leftist politicians
Chokri Belaid on February 6, 2013, and Mohamed Brahmi on July
25, 2013, brought the country to the brink of civil war.41
Tunisia’s remarkable recovery from this point onward is wellknown. Civil society organizations intervened at this crucial
impasse, creating a National Dialogue that saw the main political
parties compromise on contested issues, dissolve the government,
hold new elections, and eventually adopt a new constitution.42 The
four civil society organizations that established and drove the
National Dialogue became known as the National Quartet.43 Over
the course of several months, the Quartet worked closely with the
leaders of Tunisia’s political parties, culminating in a voluntary
dissolution of the elected government and the decision to hold new
elections by the end of 2014.44 Following a second round of postrevolutionary elections, the Tunisian parliament drafted a new
constitution, which it then adopted on January 26, 2014.45 As noted

40.
41.

42.

43.
44.
45.

See id.
Id.; Monica Marks, Tunisia’s Ennahda: Rethinking Islamism in the Context of ISIS
and the Egyptian Coup, in RETHINKING POLITICAL ISLAM SERIES 1, 8–9 (2015)
[hereinafter Marks I], https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/07/Tunisia_Marks-FINALE-5.pdf; see also Carlotta Gall,
Islamist Party in Tunisia Concedes to Secularists, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2014)
[hereinafter Gall I],
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/28/world/africa/nidaa-tounes-ennahda-tunisianparliamentary-election.html (“Many Ennahda members had emerged from prison or
had returned from exile after the revolution and were afforded some sympathy. Yet
they proved largely inexperienced and unable to manage the mounting instability,
and alienated many by allowing a rapid spread of Islamist groups, some of which
turned to violence.”).
Kéfi, supra note 38, at 239–40 (“A marathon of meetings from September to
December 2013 allowed them to reach a solution acceptable to all parties, which
consisted in dissolving of the government, establishing a technocratic government
entrusted with managing daily affairs and creating the conditions for holding
legislative and presidential elections by the end of 2014, and accelerating the
adoption of the new constitution.”).
Borger, supra note 16.
Id.; Kéfi, supra note 38, at 239–40.
See Tunisia Signs New Constitution, GUARDIAN (Jan. 27, 2014, 10:38 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/tunisia-signs-new-constitutionprogressive; Tunisia Signs New Constitution into Law, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 27, 2014),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/01/tunisia-assembly-approves-newconstitution-201412622480531861.html (“The new constitution, seen as one of the
most progressive in the region, guarantees equal rights for men and women.”).
Furthermore, then President Moncef Marzouki stated: “With the birth of this text, we
confirm our victory over dictatorship.” Id.
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above, the Quartet received the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize Award for its
efforts.46
Now, more than six years removed from the start of the Arab
Spring, Tunisia is the only country that emerged as a democratic
state.47 Across North Africa and the Middle East, popular uprisings
gave way to authoritarian resilience, military coups, and civil war.48
Despite the democratic promise of the initial protests, many
commentators now question whether the region is worse than it was
before the uprisings began.49 Darker and more pessimistic narratives
have replaced those that all but guaranteed a revitalized Arab world
rooted in democracy and human rights.50 Likewise, narratives
focused on Tunisian exceptionalism abound, as scholars and analysts
attempt to explain how Tunisia succeeded where other states failed.51
This Part continues by arguing for a more critical understanding of
the Arab Spring that challenges simplistic narratives and addresses
the more unsettling outcomes created by these popular uprisings.52 It
also explores Tunisian exceptionalism and the history, evolution, and
governance of Ennahda.53 A fuller comprehension of the Arab
Spring, Tunisian exceptionalism, and Ennahda, are necessary to
understand the success of women’s rights activists in maintaining and
then advancing women’s rights in Tunisia after the revolution.

46.
47.

48.
49.
50.

51.
52.
53.

The Nobel Peace Prize for 2015, supra note 16.
See Soumaya Ghannoushi, Tunisia is Showing the Arab World How to Nurture
Democracy, GUARDIAN (Oct. 25, 2014, 6:00 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/25/tunisia-arab-worlddemocracy-elections; Ariel Zilber, Has Tunisia Replaced Israel as the Middle East’s
Only Genuine Democracy?, JERUSALEM POST (Apr. 2, 2016, 3:37 AM),
http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Has-Tunisia-replaced-Israel-as-the-Middle-Eastsonly-genuine-democracy-449905 (discussing Tunisia’s status as the sole democratic
state in the Middle East).
See The Arab Winter, ECONOMIST (Jan. 9, 2016),
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21685503-five-years-afterwave-uprisings-arab-world-worse-ever.
See, e.g., id.; Michael J. Totten, Year Four: The Arab Spring Proved Everyone
Wrong, WORLD AFF. J. (2014), http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/year-fourarab-spring-proved-everyone-wrong.
See, e.g., Kamel Daoud, The Sexual Misery of the Arab World, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12,
2016) [hereinafter Daoud I],
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/opinion/sunday/the-sexual-misery-of-the-arabworld.html (“Those movements have come to look imperfect, even ugly: For one
thing, they have failed to touch ideas, culture, religion or social norms, especially the
norms relating to sex. Revolution doesn’t mean modernity.”).
See Zilber, supra note 47.
See infra Sections II.A–II.B.
See infra Section II.C.
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A. Toward a More Critical Understanding of the Arab Spring
1.

Reductionist Narratives

Dichotomies are seldom helpful in understanding political
dynamics or social change. This is certainly true in post-Arab Spring
countries.54 For example, although often relied upon to explain social
tension and political violence, simplistic democratic-versus-Islamist
narratives do not adequately describe the complex and evolving
nature of the political economies within these states. As Ashraf El
Sherif argues, “it makes no sense today to divide Arab politics into
neatly crafted opposites, the ‘Islamist’ versus the ‘civil democratic’
blocs.”55 Indeed, Islamist movements in the post-Arab Spring
Middle East and North Africa show significant diversity and include
reformists, members of the old Islamist guard, militants, and
revisionists.56
Likewise, Paola Rivetti argues that scholarly assessments of the
Arab Spring tend to fall between a binary dynamic of democratic
change or authoritarian continuity.57 Instead, she argues that, when
examining any revolutionary process, “there should also be an
emphasis on what has not suddenly changed from one day to the
next, and more attention should be paid to long term processes of
change, whose culminating moments are revolutions, instead of
conceptualising revolutions as unexpected and sudden events.”58
2.

Who Says the Revolution Is Over?

While reductionist narratives fail to advance a sound understanding
of the complex situation within the Arab Spring-affected countries, so
too does shortsighted analysis that attempts to make final
pronouncements on the success or failure of the uprisings. The
tendency to make such pronouncements was especially evident in the
weeks and months that immediately followed the Arab Spring. Thus,
Magid Shihade argues that even scholars sympathetic to the struggles
54.

55.
56.
57.
58.

Nadia Marzouki, Tunisia’s Rotten Compromise, MIDDLE E. RES. & INFO. PROJECT
(July 10, 2015), http://www.merip.org/mero/mero071015 (“The approach of Western
countries to the Arab world often fluctuates between indifference and indiscriminate
applause.”).
Ashraf El Sherif, Islamism After the Arab Spring, 110 CURRENT HIST. 358, 358
(2011).
Id. at 359–62.
Paola Rivetti, Continuity and Change Before and After the Uprisings in Tunisia,
Egypt and Morocco: Regime Reconfiguration and Policymaking in North Africa, 42
BRIT. J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 1, 1 (2015).
Id.
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of the Arab people have “rushed quickly to claim expertise on the
Arab revolution, and to make early judgments on it weeks or [a] few
months after it started, as if it is something that ended, rather than
seeing it as something that is in the making.”59 As a comparison,
Shihade notes that the French Revolution took ten years to complete,
only to become a force of colonial oppression and foreign
intervention within the Third World.60 Thus, Shihade finds that it is
much more useful to view these revolutions as a “continuous
process,” rather than a neatly defined event that ended as soon as the
crowds dispersed or the leaders fled.61
Rivetti arrives at a similar conclusion, finding that “no regime
surviving the uprisings has remained the same and no ‘new’ regime
in place after the uprisings is entirely new.”62 Insightfully, she notes
that “elements of both rupture and stability are present at the same
time.”63 Olfa Youssef, a Tunisian professor and linguist, takes a
different position, arguing that the Tunisian Revolution was not in
Instead, Youssef concludes that Tunisia
fact a revolution.64
experienced “an uprising staged by marginalized and unemployed
people, subsequently hijacked by intellectuals and youths who were
eager to gain freedom, whilst the uprising was then backed by foreign
powers and fulfilled by the flight of the former president.”65
Although disconcerting, Youssef’s interpretation of the uprisings
invites a more critical and perhaps more thoughtful analysis of these
events. For example, her assertion of what amounts to a social class
co-option of street level protests and the charge of strategic foreign
support problematizes less nuanced readings of these events.66 Social
class issues in particular create a challenge that Tunisia has yet to

59.
60.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Magid Shihade, On the Difficulty in Predicting and Understanding the Arab Spring:
Orientalism, Euro-Centrism, and Modernity, 17 INT’L J. PEACE STUD. 57, 60 (2012).
Id.; cf. Marzouki, supra note 54 (“The encomia are often based on the patronizing
assumption that Tunisia’s achievements are ‘good enough’ for an Arab country, or
on the Western-centric consideration that it took France and America two centuries
to achieve several of the democratic goals that underpinned their respective
revolutions.”).
Shihade, supra note 59, at 67.
Rivetti, supra note 57, at 5.
Id. at 6. Furthermore, she notes that determining when the uprisings “actually
started and when they terminated is a rather difficult, if not impossible task.” Id. at
7.
Adel al-Toraifi, Is Tunisia Really an Exception?, AL ARABIYA NEWS (June 12,
2012), http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2012/06/12/220157.html.
Id.
Id.
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address in a satisfactory manner following the revolution.67 Ben
Ali’s repressive government did not allow Tunisians to work through
these and other issues, and instead forced a false image of unification
and social homogeneity that did not exist beyond a superficially
imposed level.68 Monica Marks makes this point as well, stating:
“Forced to look into regime-manufactured funhouse mirrors that
showed only images of progress, stability, and unification, Tunisian
society was unable to truthfully confront itself before the revolution,
let alone grapple with its long-repressed issues of discontent and
difference.”69
B. Unsettling Outcomes
In addition to these difficult questions, it is important to address the
negative and often violent outcomes that accompanied or followed
popular uprisings throughout the Middle East and North Africa. The
decline of human rights, fractured communities, failed economies,
and loss of security throughout the region showed the dark side of
these popular uprisings, and provides a stark reminder that the fall of
regimes—even those as repressive as that of Muammar Gaddafi or
Hosni Mubarak—can result in arguably worse conditions for the
citizens of these states.70 Although Tunisia escaped the civil wars of
Syria and Yemen, the chronic violence of Libya and Iraq, and the
revitalized repression of Egypt and Bahrain, it nonetheless

67.

68.

69.
70.

See Michael Robbins, Five Years After the Revolution, More and More Tunisians
Support Democracy, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (May 20, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/20/are-tunisiansmore-optimistic-about-democracy-after-5-years-living-under-it/ (discussing the
Tunisian population’s embrace of democracy and struggle to improve its economy
and unify the different sections of Tunisian society).
Monica L. Marks, Convince, Coerce, or Compromise? Ennahda’s Approach to
Tunisia’s Constitution, BROOKINGS DOHA CTR. 11 (2014) [hereinafter Marks II],
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Ennahda-ApproachTunisia-Constitution-English.pdf; see also Ahmed Medien, Ben Ali’s Political
Propaganda Conspicuously Absent, TUNIS. LIVE (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.tunisialive.net/2011/11/07/november-7th-2011-ends-up-with-ben-alis-political-propaganda/
(discussing Ben Ali’s manipulation of media and other sources as a mechanism for
maintaining superficial homogeneity and unification).
Marks II, supra note 68, at 11.
See, e.g., Joshua Keating, Cairo Quiet on Anniversary of Uprising, SLATE (Jan. 25,
2016, 3:37 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/01/25/cairo_quiet_on_anniversary_of_
uprising_that_brought_down_mubarak.html (“Five years after the revolution,
Egypt’s military-backed government is firmly in control, and in some ways more
repressive than the Mubarak regime ever was.”).
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encountered serious obstacles that threatened its transition to a
democratic state.71
A weak economy and persistent socioeconomic concerns provided
the greatest structural and long-term obstacles to Tunisia’s
democratic transition, but the rise of a militant Salifist movement
presented a more immediate obstacle.72 Long repressed under Ben
Ali’s secular authoritarianism, ultraconservative Salafis used the
departure of Ben Ali to reassert themselves into Tunisia’s social
discourse and political debate.73 Of course, Salafi itself is a
problematic term that many conflate with militancy or violence.74 In
contrast, numerous conservative Muslims identify as Salafist in some
way without resorting to violence. Nonetheless, a small militant
Salifist movement emerged in Tunisia, threatening the country’s
peace and security.75
Shortly after the revolution, Salafis began attacking alcohol stores
and destroying Sufi shrines.76 Self-identified Salafis also attacked the
Tunisian General Labor Union during peaceful demonstrations.77
The role of Islam in Tunisia’s post-revolutionary state remained the
most divisive aspect of the transition, and many felt that Ennahda
could have done more to prevent these attacks and acted with too

71.

72.

73.
74.

75.

76.
77.

Christian Åhlund, Four Years After the Revolution: Tunisia Still Upholds the Values
of the Arab Spring, INT’L LEGAL ASSISTANCE CONSORTIUM: BLOG (Jan. 13, 2015),
http://www.ilacnet.org/blog/2015/01/13/four-years-after-the-revolution-tunisia-stillupholds-the-values-of-the-arab-spring/.
See Lisa Watanabe, Tunisia: The Challenges of Transition, CTR. FOR SECURITY
STUD. ANALYSIS 1–3 (2013), http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/specialinterest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSS-Analysis-135-EN.pdf
(discussing the political, socioeconomic, and other challenges facing the Tunisian
people in the wake of their revolution).
Monica Marks, Who are Tunisia’s Salafis?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 28, 2012)
[hereinafter Marks III], http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/28/who-are-tunisiassalafis/.
Stephen Zhou, “Salafi” Does Not Equal “Terrorist”: Stop Assuming all
Conservative Muslims Are Violent Extremists, SALON (Dec. 21, 2015, 6:58 PM),
http://www.salon.com/2015/12/21/salafi_does_not_equal_terrorist_stop_assuming_a
ll_conservative_muslims_are_violent_extremists/.
See Tunisian Court Jails Salafists for Burning Sufi Shrine, VOICE AM. NEWS (June
18, 2013, 1:31 PM) [hereinafter VOA], http://www.voanews.com/content/tunisiancourt-jails-salafists-for-burning-sufi-shrine/1684244.html (discussing the increased
risk of violence in areas where Salafist groups are present).
Marks II, supra note 68, at 8; see also VOA, supra note 75 (discussing the increased
risk of violence in areas where Salafist groups are present).
Ahmed Charai & Joseph Braude, Tunisia Is No Exception, NAT’L INT. (Feb. 15,
2013), http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/tunisia-no-exception-8108 (“Islamists
were largely absent from the 2010–2011 demonstrations that led to the ouster of
former president Ben Ali . . . .”).
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much leniency afterwards.78 Counterinsurgency strategists note that
groups target cultural artifacts and religious shrines for a variety of
reasons, including to reassert power by “rewriting history and
obliterating alternative religious and ideological narratives.”79
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Salafist attacks on Sufi shrines triggered a
strong Islamist backlash.80
This backlash reached its peak following the assassinations of
leftist politicians Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi.81 Although
the animus toward Islamist groups has largely subsided, religious
extremism persists, as demonstrated by the March 18, 2015 attack on
the Bardo Museum that left twenty-two people dead and an even
deadlier mass shooting on June 26, 2015 at a tourist resort north of
Sousse that resulted in thirty-eight deaths.82 Furthermore, by the end
of 2015, between 6,000 and 7,000 Tunisians had left the country to
fight for ISIS, and as many as 15,000 Tunisians received an
international travel ban because government officials suspected them
of ISIS.83 Incredibly, even a conservative estimate that 6,000
Tunisians joined ISIS is considerably more than the next two highest-

78.

79.

80.

81.
82.

83.

See Carlotta Gall, Islamist Party in Tunisia to Step Down, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28,
2013) [hereinafter Gall II],
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/world/africa/islamist-party-in-tunisia-to-stepdown.html (noting the opposing parties’ increased frustration with Ennahda); VOA,
supra note 75 (“But secularists say the Ennahda party, the Tunisian arm of the
Muslim Brotherhood which governs in coalition with secular parties, has been too
lenient on the Salafists, giving them the confidence to step up their demands.”).
Christopher Jasparro, The Case for Cultural Heritage Protection as an Element of
COIN, in THE FUTURE OF COUNTERINSURGENCY: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN
INTERNAL SECURITY STRATEGY 91, 96 (Lawrence E. Cline & Paul Shemella eds.,
2015).
Ishaan Tharoor, The Beautiful, Historic Shrines that Islamists Try to Destroy, WASH.
POST (July 25, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/07/25/the-beautifulhistoric-shrines-that-islamists-try-to-destroy/.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also Marks II, supra note 68, at 8 n.15,
29 (discussing the organization and challenges faced by Ennahda).
David D. Kirkpatrick, Tunisia Museum Attack Is Blow to Nation’s Democratic Shift,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/19/world/africa/gunmen-attack-tunis-bardonational-museum.html?_r=1; Farah Samti & Carlotta Gall, Tunisia Attack Kills at
Least 38 at Beach Resort Hotel, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/world/africa/gunmen-attack-hotel-in-soussetunisia.html.
Yaroslav Trofimov, How Tunisia Became a Top Source of ISIS Recruits, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 25, 2016, 5:30 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-tunisia-became-a-topsource-of-isis-recruits-1456396203.
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contributing countries combined: Saudi Arabia (2,500) and Russia
(2,400).84
While Tunisia’s democracy has so far managed to withstand this
political violence, the large number of ISIS defections, as well as less
obvious socioeconomic indicators, demonstrate that dissatisfaction
remains high, at least within a particular segment of Tunisian
society.85 Whether this dissatisfaction will reach a point where it
threatens Tunisia’s democracy remains unknown.86 At the very least,
this violence frustrates Tunisia’s transition toward a full-fledged and
inclusive democracy and complicates the dominant narrative of
Tunisia’s exceptionalism.
C. Tunisian Exceptionalism
Tunisia has proved to be the exception to the rule in the Arab
Spring, as it remains the only country to transition successfully to a
democratic state.87 In 2015, Freedom House assessed Tunisia as
free—the organization’s “most free” country designation—marking
the first time that a North African state received this designation
since Freedom House began its annual assessment of political and
civil rights in 1972.88 Furthermore, Tunisia is the only Arab-majority
country to receive Freedom House’s “free” designation since
Lebanon did between 1974 and 1976.89
Tunisian exceptionalism, in addition to whether this outcome is
replicable within other Arab states, has become an incredibly popular
topic for academics, policymakers, and journalists, as demonstrated
by an already substantial academic and popular literature, as well as
numerous academic conferences and symposia dedicated to this
topic.90 As the narrative of the Arab Spring darkens with ongoing
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.; Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment on the Flow of Foreign Fighters into
Syria and Iraq, THE SOUFAN GROUP 9 (Dec. 2015), http://soufangroup.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf.
See Trofimov, supra note 83.
For an argument that Salafists will not have a lasting effect on Tunisia, see El Sherif,
supra note 55, at 363 (finding that the Salafists and the Islamic Liberation Party
“[a]re not likely to make much noise” because “they are past their prime”).
Fagan, supra note 15.
Id.
Puddington, supra note 15, at 1.
For a few of the numerous books and articles discussing this question, see Kéfi,
supra note 38, at 237 (“In the devastated landscape of what has rather hastily been
called the Arab Spring, Tunisia is an exception.”) (characterizing Tunisia as “a
relative island of stability in a chaotic region” and “a sort of solitary democracy lost
in an ocean of autocratic regimes and failed states”); Owen Bennett-Jones, Is Tunisia
a Role Model for the Arab World?, BBC NEWS (Dec. 2, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30273807; Kamel Daoud, Tunisia Is the
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civil wars and the resurgence of repressive governments
overshadowing earlier and more hopeful moments, some
commentators have expressed doubt that Tunisia’s democratic
government will avoid a similar fate.91 Although these gloomy
predictions have not occurred, a replication of the Tunisian exception
seems unlikely, especially in the short-term.92
Moreover, Tunisian exceptionalism does not always benefit the
country. For example, Tunisia’s successful democratic transition, in
conjunction with the failure of other Arab states to become
democratic and secure, has made Tunisia a target of Islamist
militants, including ISIS, as these militants have filled power
vacuums left from unsuccessful transitions.93 Tunisia’s geography
only increases these security concerns, as it is “sandwiched between

91.

92.

93.

Exception, Not the Model, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Daoud II],
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/28/opinion/tunisia-is-the-exception-not-therule.html (“Tunisia is less a model than a unique case.”); Bruce Maddy-Weitzman,
Tunisia: Exemplar or Exception?, FOREIGN POL’Y RES. INST. (Jan. 2011),
http://www.fpri.org/docs/media/201101.maddy-weitzman.tunisia.pdf (“Tunisia
seems to be more of an exceptional case, rather than an applicable model and a
trigger for cascading popular democratic movements elsewhere.”). For two recent
examples of academic events taking up this topic, see Frej Stambouli, Is Tunisia an
Exception Within the “Arab Spring”?, U. HELSINKI, SWED. SCH. SOC. SCI. (Jan. 27,
2015, 2:15 PM), http://sockom.helsinki.fi/ceren/aktuellt/Stambouli_270115.pdf;
International Symposium on Democratic Transition, DEAKIN U. (Sept. 11, 2015),
http://www.deakin.edu.au/alfred-deakin-institute/news/news-archive/2015archive/democratic-transition-in-tunisia.
But see Richard Cincotta, Will Tunisia’s Democracy Survive? A View from Political
Demography, NEW SECURITY BEAT (May 12, 2015),
https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2015/05/tunisias-democracy-survive-viewpolitical-demography/ (“From political demography’s statistical perspective, Tunisia
is far from the anomaly that Middle East analysts too often portray it to be.”).
Cincotta further argues that by applying an age-structural model to predict whether
states will attain liberal democracy, political demographers predicted Tunisia would
become a liberal democracy in 2010. Id.
Joshua Keating, Why Was Tunisia the Only Arab Spring Country that Turned Out
Well?, SLATE (Jan. 28, 2015, 3:58 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/01/28/why_was_tunisia_the_only_arab
_spring_country_that_turned_out_well.html (“Tunisia is still the Arab Spring’s lone
success story. The problem, for those who would seek to apply lessons of the
‘Tunisia model’ elsewhere, is that the circumstances that allowed this to happen are
pretty specific and hard to replicate.”).
Michael D. Rich & K. Jack Riley, Tunisia in the Crosshairs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (June 22, 2015, 1:30 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/worldreport/2015/06/22/tunisia-arab-spring-success-story-is-a-key-target-of-islamic-stategroup (“Tunisia, which gave birth to the Arab Spring more than four years ago,
stands out as a notable exception, making it an inviting target for threats from the
Islamic State group.”).
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two larger, and substantially less secure, neighbors (Algeria and
Libya).”94
Given the failure of other Arab states to achieve a similar
transition, it is worth considering which factors contributed most
strongly to Tunisia’s positive and markedly different outcome.
Historian L. Carl Brown notes that unlike some Arab states, “Tunisia
is ethnically, religiously and linguistically unified.”95 Fellow
historian Bruce Maddy-Weitzman also notes the relatively strong
degree of social cohesion within Tunisian society: “Tunisia’s precolonial and colonial eras had already laid the groundwork for a
compact, well-defined entity which evolved into a relatively
homogenous national state, one with a high degree of legitimacy and
collective consciousness.”96 In addition, a sizable middle class, a
large industrial sector, and very limited oil and gas reserves did not
allow for the establishment of a rent-seeking regime similar to nearby
Libya or Sudan, and instead contributed to a society less likely to be
susceptible to divisive tactics during a national uprising.97 Of course,
political activists and civil society organizations also played crucial
roles during the uprisings—a topic addressed more fully below.98
Finally, the restraint of the Tunisian Army was crucial.99 Never a
significant part of President Habib Bourguiba or President Ben Ali’s
political apparatus, the commander of the Tunisian Army refused Ben
Ali’s order that the army confront the protestors.100 Indeed, unlike in
Egypt, Tunisia’s army remained “solidly off stage.”101
While Tunisia is very much an exception, an uncritical reliance on
this narrative carries risk as well. In 2015, former Tunisian Minister
of Communications Oussama Romdhani argued that, as a cultural
exception, Tunisia “has been atrophying for decades now.”102
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

102.

Id.
L. Carl Brown, The Tunisian Exception, INFORMED COMMENT (Oct. 14, 2014),
http://www.juancole.com/2014/10/the-tunisian-exception.html
Maddy-Weitzman, supra note 90.
Id.
See infra notes 238–41 and accompanying text.
Brown, supra note 95.
Id.
Id.; see also Francis Ghilès, Tunisia: The Arab Exception’s Test, OPEN DEMOCRACY
(Dec. 21, 2014), https://www.opendemocracy.net/francis-ghil%C3%A8s/tunisiaarab-exception's-test (“The army played a decisive role by not intervening; its refusal
to fire on demonstrators contrasted with the response of militaries in other Arab
states. It has played a key role in helping maintain the peace during the past four
turbulent years.”).
Oussama Romdhani, The Sousse Terrorist Episode and the Tunisian Exception, NEW
AFR. MAG. (July 6, 2015), http://newafricanmagazine.com/the-sousse-terroristepisode-and-the-tunisian-exception/.
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Romdhani also argued that for a subsection of the population,
Tunisia’s values of moderation and openness “have proved to be no
match to the onslaught of religious extremism brought about by
Middle Eastern preachers and amplified by satellite television and the
[I]nternet.”103
Finally, by uncritically regarding Tunisia as exceptional, Orientalist
narratives suggesting that Tunisia’s exceptionalism proves a larger
rule of the incompatibility between Arab states and democracy may
take root.104 As Marzouki and Meddeb note: “Since December 2014,
Western officials and analysts have very actively, almost
aggressively, celebrated the Tunisian ‘success,’ which is alternatively
defined as an ‘exception’ or a ‘model’ in a chaotic Arab world.”105
Simply labeling Tunisia exceptional for showing an absence of chaos
does not adequately reflect the struggle and achievement of reaching
and maintaining democracy. Furthermore, such a perspective
implicitly equates chaos as the norm, suggesting that Tunisia is an
outlier, whereas authoritarianism or lawlessness is expected. Lastly,
celebrating Tunisia’s procedural democracy without critically
appraising whether conditions have improved substantively risks
conflating successful elections with root change, which is rarely, if
ever, true. Thus, Marzouki emphasizes: “The narrative of Tunisian
success based on compromise should thus be employed with extreme
caution. Despite great achievements since 2011, the country is very
far from having robust political pluralism or finding political
channels for social grievances.”106

103.
104.

105.
106.

Id.
See, e.g., Robert Springborg, Egypt: Confronting the Challenge of Low Level
Insurgency, in THE FUTURE OF COUNTERINSURGENCY: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN
INTERNAL SECURITY STRATEGY 236, 239 (Lawrence E. Cline & Paul Shemella eds.,
2015) (“With the apparent exception of Tunisia, Arab states seem incapable of
reform and relatively peaceful democratic transitions.”). But see The Guardian View
on Tunisia’s Transition: A Success Story, GUARDIAN (Dec. 26, 2014, 2:03 PM)
[hereinafter, A Success Story],
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/26/guardian-view-tunisiatransition-success-story (“But Tunisia’s success so far confirms that democracy and
Islam are in no way a contradiction.”).
Nadia Marzouki & Hamza Meddeb, Tunisia: Democratic Miracle or Mirage?,
JADALIYYA (June 11, 2015),
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21863/tunisia_democratic-miracle-or-mirage.
Marzouki, supra note 54.
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D. Ennahda: History and Evolution, Governance and Compromise
Although the National Quartet rightfully received the Nobel Peace
Prize, Ennahda also deserves significant credit for its contribution to
Tunisia’s democratic transition.107
1.

Political History and Evolution

Ennahda’s strong commitment to democracy, tolerance, and
pluralism, as well as its willingness to re-examine its positions and
evolve, distinguish it not only from other Islamist political parties,
but also from the majority of political parties within the Middle East
and North Africa (MENA).108 Particularly after the revolution, many
Tunisians viewed Ennahda as a legitimate alternative to the
repressive governance that defined the Bourguiba and Ben Ali
regimes.109
Additionally, Ennahda developed good working
relationships with human rights organizations, labor unions, and other
opposition parties by enduring similar experiences of repression.110
Although post-revolution electoral politics strained these
relationships, these shared experiences allowed for an initial spirit of
trust and cooperation that was absent in similar dealings within other
Arab states.
Ennahda began as the Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique,
before a Ben Ali-era law disallowing political party names to contain
religious references forced the party to change its name.111 Rachid
Ghannouchi and other Islamic leaders founded Ennahda in 1981.112
From its inception, Ennahda was markedly different from most other
Islamist parties. As El Sherif notes, in 1981, Ennahda became the
first Islamist movement within the MENA region to “declare its full
107.
108.

109.
110.

111.
112.

Bennett-Jones, supra note 90 (“Tunisia’s version of the Muslim Brotherhood, the
moderate Islamist Ennahda party, should also take some of the credit.”).
See Christopher Alexander, Tunisia: The Best Bet, in THE ISLAMISTS ARE COMING:
WHO THEY REALLY ARE 39, 39 (Robin Wright ed., 2012) (“Ennahda has evolved
into an influential exemplar of moderate, pragmatic Islamism that pledges to support
human rights, pluralism, and democracy.”).
Id. at 42–43.
Marks II, supra note 68, at 9 (noting a “shared history of ideological struggle against
and brutal oppression under Ben Ali’s regime”); see also Alexander, supra note 108,
at 41 (noting that the repression of the Islamic Tendency Movement during the
1980s led to stronger ties with the human rights league, labor movement, and
opposition political parties).
Alexander, supra note 108, at 41. Moreover, whether Ennahda is a political party or
movement is a contested issue for Ennahda supporters. Throughout this article, I
refer to Ennahda as a party for clarity. See Marks II, supra note 68, at 8.
Alex Stark, Arab Exceptionalism? Tunisia’s Islamist Movement, (Jan. 31, 2011)
(unpublished essay, Wellesley College) (one file with E-Int’l Rel.), http://www.eir.info/2011/01/31/arab-exceptionalism-tunisia%E2%80%99s-islamist-movement/.
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commitment to the values of democracy, multiparty politics, and
pluralism.”113 Because this movement was viewed as a symbol of
political change, President Bourguiba ordered the arrest of Ennahda’s
leaders only six weeks after the party’s founding.114 Bourguiba then
Following
banned the party and persecuted its members.115
Bourguiba’s removal from power in 1987, Ennahda leaders attempted
to reconcile with the government.116 Newly elected President Ben
Ali was initially receptive to these conciliatory gestures and allowed
Ennahda to pursue some political activities, culminating in Ennahda’s
participation in the creation of Tunisia’s national charter in 1988.117
Ennahda’s emphasis on democracy and pluralism threatened Ben
Ali, and the party quickly fell back out of favor.118 Ghannouchi was
forced to flee Tunisia in 1989, and Ben Ali refused to recognize
Ennahda as a legal party when he created the “official opposition” in
1992.119
Ben Ali’s government also initiated an incredible
propaganda campaign against Ennahda, going so far as to
characterize this moderate party as an enemy dangerous not only to
his government, but also to civilized society.120 Despite severe state
repression and marginalization, Ennahda remained popular and
relevant, especially within poor urban areas where its informal
networks of assistance and social services met needs that the
government did not.121 Ghannouchi returned to Tunisia on January
30, 2011 after twenty-two years in exile, but declined to pursue a
position in government, and instead remained head of Ennahda.122
Although the Ennahda of post-revolutionary Tunisia is, in the
words of political scientist Shadi Hamid, “as ‘moderate’ as you can
probably get in the Arab world and still call yourself Islamist,” the
party was not always orientated this way.123 As Marks notes,
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

El Sherif, supra note 55, at 362; see Stark, supra note 112 (noting that Ennahda
embraced democracy as a “universal heritage” and supported tolerance and
pluralism).
Stark, supra note 112.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gudrun Krämer, The Integration of the Integrists: A Comparative Study of Egypt,
Jordan and Tunisia, in DEMOCRACY WITHOUT DEMOCRATS? THE RENEWAL OF
POLITICS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 200, 218 (Ghassan Salamé ed., 1994).
Stark, supra note 112 (citing Salwa Ismail, The Paradox of Islamist Politics, 221
MIDDLE EAST REP. 34, 37–38 (2001)).
Brown, supra note 95.
Keating, supra note 92.
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Ennahda has undergone two significant shifts in ideology and
political philosophy since its founding. In the 1980s, the party broke
with its conservative Salafist wing, and in the 1990s, Ghannouchi and
other Ennahda leaders re-articulated the party’s views during a major
re-evaluation.124 Ennahda’s political platform reflected these shifts
and focused on community development, human rights, and civil
society, rather than “the talismanic metapolitics of the ‘Islamic state’
and sharia.”125
Moreover, even though many commentators
portrayed Ennahda as an incredibly well-organized and disciplined
party, there was and still is considerable diversity among its
members, even on key issues.126
2.

Governance and the Politics of Compromise

Following the revolution, Ennahda emerged as the most effective
and tested political party within Tunisia.127 The 2011 elections
reflected this standing, as Ennahda won the most seats (eighty-nine)
and joined the liberal Congress for the Republic and the leftist
Ettakatol Party to form a ruling coalition.128 Nonetheless, after its
success in the 2011 elections, Ennahda began to lose support due to
the country’s poor economic performance.129 Dissatisfaction only
grew as economic conditions worsened before the critical period of
2013 marked by the assassinations of Chokri Belaid and Mohamed
Brahmi discussed above.130 In February 2013, Prime Minister
Hamadi Jebali resigned after he could not form a political coalition
following Belaid’s assassination.131 This killing caused widespread
protests and effectively ground the transitional government to a
halt.132 Together, the economic stagnation and political violence
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Marks II, supra note 68, at 16; see Francesco Cavatorta & Fabio Merone,
Moderation Through Exclusion? The Journey of the Tunisian Ennahda from
Fundamentalist to Conservative Party, 20 DEMOCRATIZATION 860–61 (2013).
El Sherif, supra note 55, at 360.
Marks II, supra note 68, at 3 (“[F]ar from being a tightly structured monolith with a
clear, religiously driven agenda – the party is in flux.”).
Alexander, supra note 108, at 43.
Tunisia’s Election Winners Form Interim Government After Uprising, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 21, 2011, 8:33 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/22/tunisiaelection-winners-ennahda-ettakatol (noting that, together, the three parties held a
comfortable majority of 139 of 217 seats).
Eileen Byrne, The Rise and Fall of the Islamists, NATIONAL (Nov. 3, 2014,
http://www.thenational.ae/world/tunisia/the-rise-and-fall-of-islamists-in-tunisia#full.
See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.
Tunisia Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali Resigns, BBC NEWS (Feb. 19, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21508498.
Id.
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proved too divisive, and Ennahda and its secular opposition reached a
political impasse that became insurmountable.133
In an attempt to restart the political process, the National Quartet
intervened in the summer of 2013.134 By late September, Ennahda
agreed to step down after months of difficult negotiation with its
political opposition.135 Ennahda ceded power to an independent
caretaker government tasked to run the country until elections in the
spring of 2014.136 Importantly, neither Ennahda nor its secular rivals
attempted unilateral or exclusive measures to resolve this impasse,
instead choosing negotiation, as both sides realized that a prolonged
political stalemate would seriously harm the country and undermine
the people’s trust in democratic governance.137 Even after agreeing
to dissolve the government, Ennahda exceeded many expectations by
gracefully accepting defeat and respecting the will of the Tunisian
people.138 Indeed, the influential Algerian writer Kamel Daoud
argues that Ennahda’s decision to step down secured stability and
warded off violence, even though the interim government was “an
elite consensus that trumped the electoral majority.”139 Thus,
somewhat counterintuitively, Ennahda arguably preserved Tunisian
democracy by allowing an unelected body to manage the state’s daily
operations until a more permanent solution became available.140
In addition to doing what it felt was best for the country, Ennahda’s
political actions supported a larger strategic decision.141 Indeed,
133.
134.

135.

136.
137.
138.

139.
140.
141.

Gall II, supra note 78.
The Nobel Peace Prize for 2015, supra note 16. The National Dialogue Quartet is
comprised of four key organizations in Tunisian civil society: Tunisian General
Labour Union; Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts; Tunisian
Human Rights League; and the Tunisian Order of Lawyers. Id.
Id. For a critical a critical appraisal of Ennahda’s two years of governance, see
Ghilès, supra note 101 (“During the two years they governed Tunisia in 2012–13,
the Islamists demonstrated their lack of interest, or inability, in addressing the
economic and social problems of a modernising society.”).
Gall II, supra note 78.
Id. (calling Ennahda’s “willingness to concede power for the good of the country . . .
a trait that deserves praise and not criticism”).
A Success Story, supra note 104 (“Indeed, whatever their earlier mistakes, the
Islamists of the Ennahda movement that came to power in 2011 accepted their defeat
at the ballot, allowing genuine political alternation.”); see also Gall I, supra note 41
(explaining the unpopularity of the Ennahda after the revolution).
Daoud II, supra note 90.
See id.
Despite Ennahda’s strategic thinking, many Western accounts simply emphasize the
“country’s penchant for consensus in general, and the conciliatory nature of the
Islamist party in particular.” Sarah Chayes, How a Leftist Labor Union Helped
Force Tunisia’s Political Settlement, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Mar.
27, 2014), http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/03/27/how-leftist-labor-union-helped-
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perhaps the best explanation for Ennahda’s decision to relinquish
power was the party’s belief in a “civilizational project”—a longterm strategy that believes “Islam’s principles, broadly interpreted,
are not only compatible with but edifying for democratic
governance.”142 Ennahda’s confidence in its long-term approach
allows it to take the long view and remain patient.143 Moreover,
Ennahda was undoubtedly rattled by the events in Egypt that saw a
swift and terrible change of fortune for the Muslim Brotherhood,
another formerly repressed and banned Islamist party that won
elections after a popular uprising.144 As Kasper Ly Netterstrøm
notes, after years of exile, imprisonment, and a corresponding fear
and distrust of the Tunisian state, for Ennahda, gaining power was
“less a question of being able to govern than of being able to
survive.”145 Achieving power also legitimized the party, which the
Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes had excluded from Tunisia’s official
history and treated as “backward and inferior.”146
As Part III illustrates, Ennahda’s willingness to compromise after it
achieved a legitimating amount of power ultimately contributed to
the success of women’s rights activists in maintaining and
strengthening their rights in post-revolutionary Tunisia.147
III. ISLAMIC FEMINISM AND THE STRUGGLE FOR GENDER
EQUALITY
A. Challenging Tradition
Islamic feminists seek to achieve gender equality while maintaining
adherence to Islam.148 To do so, Islamic scholars have reinterpreted
the legal sources of shari‘a, particularly the Qur’an and the Sunna,
arguing that while Islam requires gender equality, centuries of
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144.
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146.
147.
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force-tunisia-s-political-settlement; see also “Tunisia: Caid Essebsi – A President
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those who voted for his opponent Moncef Marzouki in this election.”).
Marks II, supra note 68, at 8.
Id. at 17 (noting a focus on long-term viability and advancing political agenda
slowly, while retracting controversial positions when necessary).
See Kasper Ly Netterstrøm, The Islamists’ Compromise in Tunisia, 26 J.
DEMOCRACY 110, 118 (2015).
Id. at 121.
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See infra Part III.
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patriarchal interpretations and misogynistic custom have distorted
this egalitarian directive and fundamental legal principle.149 Thus,
rather than rejecting their faith, Islamic feminists seek to reclaim it.150
As Elizabeth Segran notes: “Throughout the Muslim world, a
groundswell of feminist sentiment is growing among women who are
seeking to reclaim Islam and the Koran for themselves.”151
While Islamic feminists have existed to various degrees throughout
Islamic civilization, modern Islamic feminism developed alongside
second and third-wave feminism.152 Scholars such as Leila Ahmed,
Fatima Mernissi, Amina Wadud, and Amina Barlas developed
sophisticated legal arguments showing the flexibility of Islamic legal
interpretation, while remaining rooted within the Islamic tradition.153
Another aspect of this intellectual project was to demonstrate that
Islamic law could be subject to debate.154 Indeed, Islamic legal
feminists reaffirmed the divineness of the Qur’an as the immutable
word of Allah spoken through the prophet Muhammad.155 However,
they also stressed that while the Qur’an is divine, the men and
women seeking to understand it are fallible, and as a result, their
interpretations are subject to debate.156 This strategy was especially
important in the 2004 Mudawana reforms in Morocco.157
B. Scholarly Excellence Versus Grounded Reality: The Need for
Outreach and Education
Despite this exemplary scholarship and persuasive legal arguments,
gender inequality remains a daily experience for many women living
in Muslim-majority and Islamic states.158 Patriarchal social norms
and misguided legal interpretations drive inequality and can lead to
harassment, abuse, violence, and even death. As Daoud states: “In
some places, women are veiled, stoned and killed; at a minimum,
they are blamed for sowing disorder in the ideal society.”159
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See John Hursh, Advancing Women’s Rights Through Islamic Law: The Example of
Morocco, 27 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 252, 292 (2012).
Segran, supra note 148.
Hursh, supra note 153, at 291.
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Of course, gender inequality is hardly confined to Arab countries or
Islamic states. No society has yet achieved gender equality, and
women’s rights remain imperfect in all states. Nonetheless, the
concurring invisibility and centrality of women within Arab and
Muslim societies raise especially challenging gender issues. Veiling
is the most obvious social practice, particularly to non-Muslims, but
this practice is only one of many that simultaneously centralizes
gender while marginalizing women.160 Thus, Daoud observes:
Women are a recurrent theme in daily discourse, because
the stakes they personify—for manliness, honor, family
values—are great. In some countries, they are allowed
access to the public sphere only if they renounce their
bodies: To let them go uncovered would be to uncover the
desire that the Islamist, the conservative and the idle youth
feel and want to deny. Women are seen as a source of
destabilization—short skirts trigger earthquakes, some
say—and are respected only when defined by a property
relationship, as the wife of X or the daughter of Y. These
contradictions create unbearable tensions.161
To counter this problematic discourse, women’s rights activists
have utilized a variety of grassroots, social mobilization, and
lobbying efforts. As Liv Tønnessen notes, “the [MENA] region has a
rich and long history of women’s activism, whether protesting in the
streets, participating in political and religious movements, charity
networks or NGOs.”162 Islamic feminists form an important aspect of
this history, both working alongside secular human rights-based
activists and making their own contributions through determined
outreach, legal education, and other strategies and activities.163
Two of the most well-known and successful examples of Islamic
feminist organizations are Sisters of Islam and Musawah (Equality),
founded in Malaysia in 1988 and 2009, respectively.164 Musawah is
likely the most influential transnational organization working for
gender equality in the Muslim world.165 As Segran notes, “Musawah
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See id. (“Although women are veiled, they are at the center of our connections,
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Id.
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THE ARAB SPRING, CMI INSIGHT 1 (2013),
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See id. at 4.
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operates on the belief that Islam is not inherently biased toward men:
patriarchy within Muslim countries is a result of the way male
interpreters have read Islamic texts.”166 This belief informs both the
organization’s vision, “[a] world where equality, non-discrimination,
justice, and dignity are the basis of all human relations,” and its goal,
“[a] global movement for equality and justice in the Muslim family,
which advances human rights for women in Muslim contexts, in both
their public and private lives.”167 By insisting on gender equality and
arguing that patriarchy is attributable to male interpreters, Segran
concludes that, “Musawah empowers women to shape the
interpretations, norms and laws that affect their lives, then push for
legal reform in their respective countries.”168
Musawah’s engagement strategy is quite different from that of
most Western advocacy campaigns or international NGOs. By
advocating for gender equality through engagement with Islamic law
and feminist readings of Islamic scripture, Musawah finds that
“equality in the family laws in the Muslim world is both necessary
and possible without stepping outside the boundaries of religion.”169
The deep-seated patriarchy of many Muslim-majority and Islamic
states requires significant outreach and education before men (and
women) accept this position. However, this initial reluctance does
not mean that there is not substantial support for this position once it
is presented and understood. Zainah Anwar, the founder of Sisters of
Islam and a key architect of Musawah, notes that when women
realize Islam does not justify the neglect or abuse that they endure,
the reaction is cathartic.170 She states: “When they are exposed to
this new knowledge, they feel duped . . . . they believed that their
suffering in the form of abandonment, polygamy and beatings was all
in the name of God.”171 In contrast, Islamic feminists demonstrate
that these misogynistic practices contradict the principle of gender
equality found within Islamic law, thus removing the religious
justification for such harmful acts.
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IV. WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN TUNISIA
Although women’s rights activists received considerable attention
for their courageous acts and tireless organizing efforts throughout
the Arab Spring protests, the history of women’s rights activism,
organizing, and leadership within the MENA region extends much
further than the past few years. Modern women’s rights movements
in the MENA region emerged as women participated in the struggle
for national independence during the post-World War II period,
though there are many important precursors to these movements.172
In many examples, once these nationalist movements succeeded in
ousting colonial rulers, they often sacrificed women’s rights in the
interest of “national unity.”173
Likewise, women made key
contributions to the struggle against the oppressive regimes that took
hold in the decades following national independence, but rarely
received the same recognition that men did for leading civil society
efforts, human rights initiatives, and political campaigns to bring
about social and political change.174
Women received more attention and recognition for their
leadership during the Arab Spring, as cable television reporting,
Internet news platforms, and social media provided women activists
“unprecedented visibility,” which in turn helped to “shatter
stereotypes” that many viewers unfamiliar with the MENA region
held.175 As the International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH)
stated: “From Tunisia to Bahrain, from Egypt to Syria, women from
all backgrounds demanded democracy, social justice, freedom,
dignity, and equality.”176 Repressive regimes targeted—and continue
to target—the leaders and activists that led these popular uprisings,
often with brutal tactics and lethal force.177 Moreover, while both
men and women were arrested, detained, tortured, and killed by these
regimes during and after the protests, women were often targets of
additional violence including abduction, virginity tests, sexual
harassment, and rape.178
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Finally, it is important to note that women’s rights activism and the
struggle for stronger women’s rights and gender equality in the
MENA region is marked by tensions. These tensions include the
disparity in effort and recognition discussed above, as well difficult
negotiations of personal belief and entrenched patriarchal social
norms.
In Tunisia, women’s rights leaders also confronted
oppressive governments that attempted to co-opt women’s rights as
part of their foreign policy and state building initiatives. Part IV
examines these tensions by assessing women’s rights before and after
the Tunisian Revolution.179 First detailing the legal tradition and
development of women’s rights before the revolution, it then
discusses how women’s rights leaders maintained and ultimately
strengthened women’s rights after the revolution.180 This outcome is
evident in numerous legal acts, the most important of which are the
Personal Status Code, the 2011 electoral law, the 2014 Constitution,
and the withdrawing of key reservations to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW).181 Lastly, this Part concludes by assessing remaining
legal issues that hinder women’s rights and the pursuit of gender
equality in Tunisia.182
A. Women’s Rights in Tunisia: Before the Revolution
1.

A Progressive Legal Tradition

Tunisia’s history of strong women’s rights is at least partially due
to its progressive legal tradition. Tunisians abolished slavery in
1846, long before many other Arab states, and established their first
modern constitution in 1861.183 Not only was this constitution the
first modern constitution in the Arab world, it was also very
progressive and forward-looking.184 Furthermore, this constitution is
part of a longer progressive legal tradition, including the 1857 Ahd Al
Iman (Charter of Faith), which one scholar describes as “a path
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

See infra Sections IV.A–B.
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See infra Sections IV.B(3)(a)–(d).
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breaking document that stressed on equal rights under the law for the
non-Muslims (Jews and Christians) in various walks of life.”185 This
legal tradition both reflects and advances Tunisian norms of
acceptance and tolerance.
Following independence, President Bourguiba forcefully imposed
several progressive acts to advance women’s rights. In 1956,
Tunisian women gained formal equal rights in most areas of the law,
and in 1961, Bourguiba introduced family planning throughout the
country.186 These two reforms not only advanced women’s rights,
but also contributed to a strong Tunisian middle class in the first few
decades after independence.187 Although his government became
increasingly authoritarian,188 Bourguiba nonetheless demonstrated a
strong commitment to advancing women’s rights both legally and
through socioeconomic advancement.
Bourguiba also cultivated a modern mindset of women’s rights and
women’s roles in society.
Kamel Dhif gives the following
assessment: “[Bourguiba] introduced far-reaching, modernising
reforms – despite the strong-arm nature of his government – in
particular in the areas of family law and women’s rights and in
modernising mindsets. These reforms became very deeply engrained
in the new Tunisian civic spirit, not just in legislation but also in
people’s mentalities.”189 Indeed, in 2014, the staid British newspaper
The Guardian complimented Bourguiba’s presidency, which lasted
from 1959 until 1987, for leaving “an important legacy of public
education, social reform and female emancipation.”190
In contrast to Bourguiba’s rule, which descended into semiauthoritarianism after several years of progressive, if heavy-handed
governance, Ben Ali’s presidency almost immediately became a fullfledged autocracy, where corruption and elite enrichment decimated
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Tunisia’s middle class.191 Ben Ali utilized a combination of
repressive domestic policy to stifle internal dissent and manipulative
foreign policy to consolidate power and strengthen his authority.192
Repressive domestic tactics included co-opting political challengers,
intimidating and harassing critics through a well-trained and
expansive security apparatus, and when these tactics were not
enough, using physical violence and torture.193 Ben Ali’s foreign
policy was more subtle and focused on portraying Tunisia as a stable,
secular stronghold amongst a bevy of radical and dangerous Islamist
regimes.194
The goal of this policy was to garner international support and—
just as importantly—large donor commitments from key geopolitical
partners, including the United States.195 The supposed safeguarding
of women’s rights played an important part in this larger foreign
policy strategy.196 Ben Ali often invoked human rights generally and
women’s rights specifically, as well as his centrality to protecting
these rights, as an important reason for continued political and
financial support of his regime.197 He was particularly keen to
contrast relatively strong women’s rights in Tunisia with weak
women’s rights in other Arab and Islamic states, particularly within
international forums.198
This manipulation was never more evident than in the lead-up to
the historic 1995 United Nations Conference on Women in Beijing.
Fearing that women’s rights organizations would expose the regime’s
many human rights abuses, as well as its self-serving and selective
enforcement of women’s rights, Ben Ali created a state-run
alternative, the Rihana Network, to control dissent and dominate civil
191.

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See, e.g., Abdellatif al-Hanashi, Party Cadres Surpassed Their Leaderships During
the Revolution, in REVOLUTIONS, REFORM, AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN THE
ARAB HOMELAND: FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE TUNISIAN REVOLUTION 12, 12
(Doha Inst., 2011) [hereinafter REVOLUTIONS, REFORM, AND DEMOCRATIC
TRANSITION], http://english.dohainstitute.org/file/get/3166a949-4468-41ae-8b9e3096ab0d911a.pdf (noting that Ben Ali’s development policies “effectively
produced unprecedented levels of corruption and socio-economic problems”).
See Stark, supra note 112.
See ALEXIS ARIEFF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21666, POLITICAL TRANSITION IN
TUNISIA 23 (2011), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/161570.pdf.
See id. at 22–23.
See id. at 7–8, 27–28.
See Charrad & Zarrugh, supra note 18.
Stark, supra note 112 (arguing that the Ben Ali regime cultivated an image of
democratic reforms and sensitivity to human rights issues not only to gain support
domestically, but also to promote the image of a modern Arab state abroad).
See id.
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society messaging during the conference.199 The Rihana Network
forced women’s rights organizations into a very difficult position, as
they weighed the negative outcomes of missing such an important
event with concerns over contributing to a misrepresentation of
women’s rights in Tunisia should they participate.200 Indeed, these
organizations understood that Ben Ali’s regime would work tirelessly
to co-opt their message and control their activities.201 As one
commentator notes, instead of enabling Tunisian civil society, the
Rihana Network “functioned as a thinly veiled attempt by the state to
control all Tunisian NGO activities at the Beijing Conference.”202
Ultimately, the regime largely succeeded in its co-option of
women’s rights. As Sarah Gilman noted, although many autonomous
feminist activists decided to participate in the [Rihana] Network to
actively engage the state and avoid isolation and possible irrelevance,
many of the same activists later regretted this participation believing
that it led to even greater “co-optation and marginalization.”203
Furthermore, after the 1995 Conference, Ben Ali’s manipulation of
women’s rights continued in the domestic sphere, where civil society
organizations and women’s rights leaders struggled to complete
meaningful activities within an increasingly repressive state while
also avoiding co-option by the regime.204 Gilman demonstrates how
this tension required one of Tunisia’s leading women’s rights
organizations, Femmes Démocrates, to negotiate “both the state and
transnational linkages so as to avoid the extremes of co-optation and
irrelevance.”205
Despite the very serious problems discussed above, women still
benefitted from legal protections and participation in the legal
profession, further reflecting Tunisia’s progressive legal tradition.
Women have served as judges since 1968, and in 2010, women
represented 27 percent of judges and 31 percent of attorneys.206
199.

200.
201.

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Sarah E. Gilman, Feminist Organizing in Tunisia: Negotiating Transnational
Linkages and the State, in FROM PATRIARCHY TO EMPOWERMENT: WOMEN’S
PARTICIPATION, MOVEMENTS, AND RIGHTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA, AND
SOUTH ASIA 97, 110–12 (Valentine M. Moghadam ed., 2007).
Id.
See, e.g., SHELLEY DEANE, INTERNATIONAL ALERT, TRANSFORMING TUNISIA: THE
ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN TUNISIA’S TRANSITION 8–9 (2013),
http://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/publications/Tunisia2013EN.pdf
(“State security organisations repressed CSOs acting beyond the strict parameters of
corporatist civil society in Tunisia.”).
Gilman, supra note 199, at 111–12.
Id. at 111.
See id.
Id. at 119.
FIDH, supra note 174, at 12.
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Thus, despite the deeply problematic legacies of Bourguiba and Ben
Ali, there is no doubt that these two leaders advanced and
strengthened women’s rights—even if from a non-inclusive, topdown approach and for questionable, if not outright self-serving
motives.207 This tension between authoritarian rule and a progressive
legal tradition is difficult to resolve, creating a complicated legacy for
postcolonial Tunisia.208 The following section examines this legacy
more closely.
2.

A Complicated Legacy

Within postcolonial Tunisia, the tension between a strong,
centralized government and a progressive legal tradition emerged, or
perhaps solidified, during Tunisia’s struggle for independence.
Likewise, the simultaneous inclusion and exclusion of women from
this struggle demonstrates the uneven and at times even contradictory
nature of the Tunisian state-building project. This project ultimately
resulted in Ben Ali’s autocratic regime, which although repressive
and immensely corrupt, also featured expanded women’s rights that
significantly outpaced similarly situated countries in the region.209
Similar to women throughout the Middle East and North Africa,
Tunisian women made significant contributions to the country’s
nationalist struggle for independence following World War II.210
While these contributions were necessary to achieve independence,
women quickly found themselves largely shut out of political life
after colonial forces conceded and these former colonial states gained
independence.211 In turn, this political absence negatively affected
women’s rights in postcolonial states. As Tønnessen notes, “[w]hen
the revolutionary dust cleared and constitutions were decided upon
after independence from colonial rulers, women were by and large
side-lined.”212 This absence was especially damaging for women’s
rights in Muslim majority states that codified conservative
interpretations of Islamic law. Here, Tunisia’s regional neighbor
Morocco, which gained independence that same year, offers a
striking example.213
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See infra Part IV.A(2).
See MOUNIRA M. CHARRAD, STATES AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS: THE MAKING OF
POSTCOLONIAL TUNISIA, ALGERIA, AND MOROCCO 201–02 (2001).
See FIDH, supra note 174, at 10–11.
See, e.g., CHARRAD, supra note 208, at 218.
TØNNESSEN, supra note 162, at 1.
Id.
See, e.g., Valentine M. Moghadam, Global Feminism, Citizenship, and the State:
Negotiating Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa, in MIGRATIONS
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In contrast to Morocco and other Muslim-majority states that
would later gain independence, Tunisia featured a codification of
Islamic law that was shockingly progressive at the time, and remains
arguably the most gender equitable of all Islamic family codes nearly
sixty years later.214 However, this progressive character was not due
to a well-organized women’s rights movement or outspoken feminist
activists. Rather, the drafting and implementation of this progressive
Code was due largely to President Bourguiba, whose vision of
Tunisia most closely aligned to that of secular Turkey. Bourguiba’s
mark on Tunisian women’s rights is as unmistakable as it is
auspicious, as he declared himself both “‘father’ of independent
Tunisia” and “‘father’ of Tunisian women’s liberation.”215 Finally,
the fact that “Liberator of Women” is one of only three epitaphs
found on the door to Bouguiba’s mausoleum demonstrates how
serious an issue he considered women’s rights to be.216
While Bourguiba deserves praise for ensuring a progressive
codification of Islamic family law that benefitted women and
strengthened women’s rights, it remains highly problematic that he
did so almost unilaterally, with women playing little role within this
process. As Gilman notes, a male interpretation of women’s rights
and imposition of a progressive legal code onto a decidedly
conservative population resulted in something of an irony: “Tunisian
women played no role in the promulgation of the family law
legislation that ultimately propelled them, rather ironically, into the
spotlight as symbols of the ‘emancipated’ Arab woman.”217
Bourguiba’s near unilateral imposition of the Personal Status Code
provided women a critical opening to professional life and increased
autonomy. Nonetheless, this Code outpaced social and religious
mores, and calls for more conservative interpretations of Islamic law
soon began to surface, including from younger Tunisians and even
women.218 One particularly interesting example occurred in 1975,
when President Bourguiba and his guests gathered for a scholarly
lecture during Ramadan.219 Bourguiba had made this lecture a
MOBILITIES: CITIZENSHIPS, BORDERS, AND GENDER 255, 266–67 (Seyla
Benhabib & Judith Resnik eds., 2009); see also ROBIN WRIGHT, DREAMS AND
SHADOWS: THE FUTURE OF THE MIDDLE EAST 360 (2008) (explaining the two sets of
laws in Morocco); Hursh, supra note 153, at 259 (explaining the social and political
reforms in Morocco after independence).
See, e.g., FIDH, supra note 174, at 10.
Gilman, supra note 199, at 97.
Maddy-Weitzman, supra note 90, at 1.
Gilman, supra note 199, at 97.
See al-Toraifi, supra note 64.
Id.
AND
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tradition since his ascension to power in 1956, but this was the first
time that he appointed a female scholar to give it.220 Instead of
praising Bourguiba and the progressive Personal Status Code,
renowned philosophy professor Hind Shalabi criticized key
provisions of the Code and called for a return “to the fundamental
foundations of [Islam].”221
Although this criticism outraged
Bourguiba, he quickly learned that this sentiment was prevalent
throughout Tunisia’s universities and the country’s youth.222 Thus,
Adel al-Toraifi notes that “[w]ith considerable bitterness, Habib
Bourguiba felt that what he had achieved through education, and
through the promotion of Western systems and laws, was vanishing
amidst what he deemed to be a ‘reactionary’ discourse.”223
Bourguiba’s labeling of this discourse as “reactionary” is
particularly interesting, since conservative critics could argue that his
Personal Status Code was equally reactionary, albeit with a
progressive aim that “reacted” against traditional Islamic values by
displacing the mosque and religious leaders with state courts,
secularly trained judges, and bureaucratic officials.224 Indeed, the
codification of Islamic family law that Bourguiba oversaw was nearly
as progressive as Shalabi’s call for a return to fundamental Islamic
values was conservative.225 Between these two disparate positions,
independent women’s rights organizations struggled to find a middle
path.226 Furthermore, throughout the 1970s, the government’s
growing intolerance of dissent made finding this middle ground even
more difficult, and state influence, if not outright control, of many
aspects of civil society increased, resulting in what was deemed a
“monolithic state feminism.”227
And while Tunisia officially
continued as a secular state that hardly tolerated political Islam,
including Islamic feminism, beneath the surface, various forms of

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

226.
227.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Compare Gilman, supra note 199, at 97 (describing the Personal Status Code,
enacted under Bourguiba as “a document that broke with Islamic law,” which
“radically reform[ed] Muslim family law”), with Al-Toraifi, supra note 217 (noting
that Hind Shalabi viewed the new family law “as a complete contradiction to Islam”
and that Tunisia should “return to the fundamental foundations of [Islam]”).
See Segran, supra note 148.
Gilman, supra note 199, at 98.
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political Islam were taking root and gaining support, especially in
Tunisia’s underdeveloped south.228
While women’s rights in Tunisia remained strong, particularly
compared to its regional neighbors, discouraging trends also
continued, even if not immediately apparent. As one scholars notes,
the 1980s saw a “male-dominated political left and [a] homogenizing,
authoritarian state” continue to shrink the space for women’s rights
activists and feminists (whether secular or religious) to pursue their
own objectives or to challenge existing laws or social norms.229
Complicating this relationship, Tunisia’s political elite, whether
progressive or conservative, and including the women’s movement,
remains geographically concentrated and predominantly urban.230
Indeed, political elites of all persuasions remain “centered
exclusively in the capital city of Tunis.”231 This concentration itself
speaks to the non-inclusive nature of political groups and civil society
organizations throughout the Bourguiba and Ben Ali governments,
raising the unsettling possibility that at least within a subset of
postcolonial states, women’s rights are achieved not through broad
consensus or grassroots efforts, but through strong centralized
governments, or even authoritarian regimes.
B. Women’s Rights During and After the Tunisian Revolution
As noted above, women’s rights movements and women-led
activism is not new to the Middle East and North Africa.232 Within
Tunisia, just as women played an important role in the struggle for
national independence, they also played a crucial role in the popular
uprisings that coalesced into the Tunisian Revolution and forced Ben
Ali to flee the country.233 Indeed, throughout the MENA region,
women organized, protested, and fought alongside men in the popular
228.
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See Noah Feldman, Islamists’ Victory in Tunisia a Win for Democracy, BLOOMBERG
(Oct. 30, 2011, 7:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2011-1030/islamists-victory-in-tunisia-a-win-for-democracy-noah-feldman. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, Ennahda’s “intellectual leader” Rached Ghannouchi hails from
Gabes in southern Tunisia. Marwa, Rached Ghannouchi, TUNISIALIVE (Dec. 5,
2011), http://www.tunisia-live.net/whoswho/rached-ghannouchi-2/.
Gilman, supra note 199, at 97–98.
Id. at 103.
Id.
TØNNESSEN, supra note 162, at 4 (“Women activism is not new. It has a long and
rich history in the MENA region.”).
See Women’s Learning P’ship, Women’s Rights and the Arab Spring: Middle
East/North Africa Overview and Fact Sheet, INT’L WOMEN’S DEMOCRACY NETWORK
(Nov. 4, 2011, 3:18 PM),
http://www.iwdn.learningpartnership.org/2011/11/womens-rights-and-the-arabspring-middle-eastnorth-africa-overview-and-fact-sheet/.
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uprisings that later became known as the Arab Spring.234 As the
Arab Spring protests subsided and transitional governments began to
form, questions arose as to whether women would retain the voice
and influence exhibited during the protests.235 Further complicating
this question was the rise of political Islam. Although there are
exceptions, and it is important to recall that political Islam has many
variations within even a single country;236 historically, this school of
political thought has sought to exclude women from the public sphere
and to maintain separate roles for men and women, while also
upholding a patriarchal interpretation of Islam.237
These questions quickly came to the fore in Tunisia, after Ennahda
dominated the October 2011 elections for the Constituent Assembly
by winning 89 of 217 seats.238 Numerous commentators expressed
strong concerns that, despite Ennahda’s stated commitment to
upholding women’s rights, the party would act differently once in
power.239 While Ennahda insisted that it would respect women’s
rights and the professional gains that women made under the
Bourguiba and then Ben Ali governments, a vocal Salafist minority
made no such promises and introduced a deeply conservative
interpretation of Islam into Tunisia’s public sphere.240 Although this
deeply conservative perspective was undoubtedly present before the
revolution, both Bourguiba and Ben Ali refused to allow this
perspective to enter public debate.241 Without a strong government
234.
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Id. (noting that “[w]omen have been an integral part of these revolutions”); see also
MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM, REFLECTIONS ON WOMEN IN THE ARAB SPRING: WOMEN’S
VOICES FROM AROUND THE WORLD (Kendra Heideman & Mona Youssef eds., 2012),
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/International%20Women%27s%20
Day%202012_4_0.pdf.
See MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM, supra note 234, at 11.
See, e.g., Liv Tønnessen, The Many Faces of Political Islam in Sudan: Muslim
Women’s Activism for and Against the State (2011) (Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Bergen) (on file with author).
See Margot Badran, Political Islam and Gender, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
ISLAM AND POLITICS 112, 114 (John L. Esposito & Emad El-Din Shahin eds., 2013).
Final Tunisian Election Results Announced, AL JAZEERA, (Nov. 14, 2011),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/11/20111114171420907168.html.
Women’s Learning P’ship, supra note 233 (“While party leaders have said they will
uphold women’s rights achieved under Ben Ali, women’s rights and democracy
activists are seriously concerned that the party [Ennahda] will act differently once in
power.”).
See Marie-Louise Gumuchian, Arab Spring Puts Women’s Rights in the Spotlight,
REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2011, 9:48 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-arabswomen-idUSTRE7BJ0QW20111220.
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2012), http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/africa/tunisias-revolution-and-thesalafi-effect#page2.
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authority to check these groups, this perspective began to reenter
public discourse. Thus, Tunisia’s transition to democratic rule
offered these conservative, and often undemocratic groups, an
opportunity to participate in public life that simply was not available
since independence.242
While the conservative beliefs of the Salafists certainly were not
allowed in political debate or public discourse throughout Bourguiba
and Ben Ali’s rule, neither were more moderate versions of political
Islam. Moreover, despite sometimes stark differences in viewpoint
between Islamist groups, Bourguiba and especially Ben Ali
effectively treated all Islamist groups as threats to Tunisia’s secular
state. Often brutally repressed throughout Tunisia’s postcolonial
statehood, Islamist activists gained religious and political freedoms
that far exceeded their rights during Tunisia’s authoritarian past.243
The expression of these rights included outcomes that conflicted with
strong secular perspectives on women’s rights. For example,
following the revolution, Tunisia witnessed a notable increase in
women wearing the hijab and niqab, as many women considered this
decision “a long-awaited ‘freedom’ after decades of religious
oppression.”244 In contrast, Bourguiba banned wearing the hijab in
state offices in 1981, and Ben Ali considered the hijab “a sign of
extremism,” banning it altogether in the 1990s.245 Interestingly, and
reflective of the many different perspectives on feminism and
women’s rights within Tunisia, while some secular commentators
characterized this change as a worrisome development, others
reporting within Tunisia showed that wearing the hijab simply was
not “a big issue among locals.”246
This final section examines women’s rights in Tunisia during and
especially after the revolution. Considering the political and social
context discussed above, it explores how civil society and the
National Dialogue shaped women’s rights in post-revolutionary
Tunisia. It then turns to the legal outcomes that followed to assess
women’s rights more than six years after the dramatic events that
plunged Tunisia onto its democratic, but uncertain path.
242.
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See, e.g., Shadi Hamid, Why Jihadists Fight, FOREIGN POLICY (June 13, 2016),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/13/why-jihadists-fight/ (noting that “[f]or decades,
Tunisia had little space for overt expressions of religion” and “Tunisia was the only
country in the Arab world that experienced both forced secularization and brutal
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See, e.g., TØNNESSEN, supra note 162, at 3.
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Id. at 3.
Byrne, supra note 129.
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1. Contestation and Reaffirmation: Women’s Rights, Political
Discourse, and Law
Following the revolution, both civil society organizations and
National Dialogue participants, and indeed perhaps the National
Dialogue process itself, contributed to a reaffirmation of robust
women’s rights in Tunisia. This reaffirmation actually served to
strengthen women’s rights, since activists and women’s rights
defenders needed to secure these rights in an open public discourse
and contested political process. Although women’s rights and their
legal expression ultimately increased after the revolution, they had
not been subject to public scrutiny and the political process in this
manner due to the initial top-down imposition of these rights in the
late 1950s.247 The fact that women’s rights withstood this scrutiny
and won widespread political support demonstrates a broad social
acceptance of these rights, even if certain topics remain contentious
among some social groups. In essence, the revolutionary process
subjected women’s rights to an unexpected test, as the authoritarian
regime that protected these rights and maintained their fixity could no
longer do so. Put to this test, civil society organizations and women’s
rights activists quickly mobilized to protect their rights to ensure that
they would remain a defining part of Tunisian life following the
revolution.
a.

Citizens and civil society

During the revolution, women from nearly all segments of Tunisian
society participated in the protests and contributed to political
organization and social mobilization efforts that resulted in Ben Ali’s
ouster. Long-standing civil society organizations dedicated to
women’s rights, as well as bloggers, journalists, activists, trade union
members, students, mothers, and others all participated in these
protests.248 The diversity of women participating in the protests and
popular uprisings suggests at least a temporary break in social norms
and gender expectations, providing for moments of almost complete
gender equality. As FIDH observed, “[t]hroughout the Tunisian
[R]evolution, women and men were equal.”249
Although it is difficult to overstate the contributions of “ordinary”
Tunisian people—women and men—toward ensuring the success of
247.
248.
249.

See, e.g., TØNNESSEN, supra note 162, at 3.
FIDH, supra note 174, at 8 (“Women of all ages, from all backgrounds an dall [sic]
walks of life participated in strikes and demonstrations.”).
Id.
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the revolution, it is equally important to appreciate the huge sacrifices
made by independent Tunisian civil society organizations. Despite
near constant suppression and attempts of co-option under Bourguiba
and Ben Ali, these organizations remained vital and active.250
Indeed, civil society organizations began to mobilize in the first hours
of the revolution following Mohamed Bouazizi’s protest of selfimmolation on December 17, 2010.251 Ali Bouazizi, Mohamed’s
cousin and an active member of the political opposition, stated,
“[t]hat was the beginning, and the Revolution began with that small
family, which was embraced by civil society.”252 Civil society
organizations and Tunisian citizens worked together and created a
popular uprising that was simply too much for Ben Ali’s regime to
withstand. Nonetheless, the rapid pace of this uprising and political
change was astonishing, as Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia on January
14, 2011, less than a month after the revolution began.253
Shelley Deane refers to this cooperative ethos as a “spirit of
solidarity,” and argues that this spirit functioned as the “source of the
Tunisian [R]evolution.”254 Formal political actors also realized the
importance of this spirit. As Deane notes, Ennahda sought to
maintain “the united civil engagement of CSOs” after winning a
strong plurality in the 2011 elections.255 Likewise, the interim
government attempted to institutionalize this engagement by creating
the Higher Authority for the Realization of Revolutionary Objectives,
Political Reform, and the Democratic Transitions on February 18,
2011.256 The creation of this body demonstrates just how important
citizens and civil society were to the revolution, as political leaders
began reforming Tunisia’s state institutions in this mold of
engagement. Additionally, it also illustrates how closely intertwined
the political and legal spheres are in revolutionary moments, where
citizens and civil society attempt to reimagine the state and its
institutions.
250.
251.
252.
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256.

Kéfi, supra note 38, at 238; see also al-Hanashi, supra note 191, at 12 (noting the
contribution of labor parties and civil society organizations to the revolution).
See Arab Ctr. for Research & Policy Studies, supra note 191, at 30 (statement of Ali
al-Bouazizi).
Id.; see also Arab Ctr. for Research & Policy Studies, Tunisian Party Leaders on
Democratic Transition and Their Visions for the Future, in REVOLUTIONS, REFORM,
AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, supra note 191, at 35 (statement of Abd al-Azeez alMasudi) (describing the revolution as “a mass movement against injustice and
humiliation” and noting that unions and civil society organizations “participated in
the revolution with effectiveness and fervor”).
See Tunisia: Ex-President Ben Ali Flees to Saudi Arabia, supra note 33.
DEANE, supra note 201, at 11.
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Transforming highly repressive states, such as Tunisia under Ben
Ali, into open societies requires a process of reimagination that can
only occur when there is a reopening of public space.257 As Charles
Tripp rightly observes, like all revolutions, the Tunisian Revolution is
best thought of as “an ongoing process of political struggle, ambition,
and contestation, as different visions for the country take shape.”258
In these revolutionary moments, it is only through what Tripp calls
the “re-appropriation of public space” that allows for “a practical
restatement of republican ideals,” where citizens can come together
and reclaim state institutions “from the hands of the small elite who
had made it a vehicle for the domination of the majority.”259
Despite its best efforts to reimagine and reclaim these institutions,
the interim government reached an impasse, if not paralysis, after the
assassination of secular politicians Chokri Belaid and Mohamed
Brahmi in 2013.260 Moreover, while civil society activists had
succeeded in uniting a disparate opposition against the regime,
economic instability and ideological competition—particularly over
sensitive topics such as women’s rights—began to hinder
cooperation.261 The only briefly reopened public space that had
allowed citizens to begin this process of reclamation began to close.
Popular protest was again unwelcome, as the government returned to
tear gas and batons to suppress protestors and check dissent.262
Legally, as well as symbolically, this closing was most evident in the
unfinished drafting of the constitution. The incomplete constitution
loomed over women’s rights, as despite recent victories, including
the preservation of the Personal Status Code and the drafting and
enactment of a progressive electoral law, constitutional questions
regarding shari‘a and women’s role in society supplanted these gains
and again stirred deep concerns among feminists and women’s rights
activists.
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The national dialogue

The success of the Quartet’s National Dialogue, including its award
of the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize, is well-known.263 Established in the
summer of 2013 through tedious, tense, and sometimes exasperating
negotiations, the Quartet prodded Tunisia’s political parties toward
compromise and eventually succeeded in allowing for the drafting
and adoption of Tunisia’s landmark constitution in 2014.264 This
slow and at times unsteady process again demonstrates the
uncertainty of legal rights after a revolutionary moment. Moreover,
women’s rights seemed especially vulnerable at times, particularly in
the darkest moments of this period when the country appeared headed
toward war. Nonetheless, the Quartet was determined that the
dialogue would succeed, and it ultimately upheld the promise of the
inclusive constitution that citizens and civil society called for at the
beginning of the revolution.265
Despite the political nature of the National Dialogue, it is important
to recall that this process was designed to facilitate a legal outcome,
namely a new constitution. Moreover, of the four organizations
comprising the Quartet, two of these organizations, the Tunisian
Human Rights League (La Ligue Tunisienne pour la Défense des
Droits de l’Homme) (LTDH) and the Tunisian Bar Association
(L’Ordre National des Avocats de Tunisie), are legal organizations.266
When accepting the award, Tunisian Bar Association President
Mohammed Fadhel Mafoudh stressed the need for dialogue and
peaceful resolution of conflict.267 Similarly, political commentator
263.
264.
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See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
Joshua Keating, Tunisia National Dialogue Quartet Gets 2015 Nobel Peace Prize,
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and often messy progress gets a lot less attention than the outright anarchy engulfing
other countries in the region”).
The Nobel Peace Prize for 2015, supra note 16 (“It established an alternative,
peaceful political process at a time when the country was on the brink of civil war.
It was thus instrumental in enabling Tunisia, in the space of a few years, to establish
a constitutional system of government guaranteeing fundamental rights for the entire
population, irrespective of gender, political conviction or religious belief.”)
(emphasis added).
See Chayes, supra note 141 (noting that of the four organizations, the Tunisian Bar
Association, founded in 1887, is the oldest).
Tribune Wire Reports, Nobel Peace Prize Boosts Struggling Tunisian Democracy,
CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 9, 2015, 1:37 PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-nobel-peace-prize-tunisia20151009-story.html (statement of Mohammed Fadhel Mafoudh) (“It’s a message to
all parties present in certain political conflicts, to tell them that everything can be
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Khaled el-Dakheel concluded that “[i]t was neither ideology nor
gunpowder that allowed [Tunisia] to survive but rather politics and
dialogue . . . .”268
When explaining its decision, the Nobel Committee stated that the
Quartet made a “decisive contribution to the building of a pluralistic
democracy” following the revolution.269 Furthermore, it found that
the National Dialogue “show[ed] that Islamist and secular political
movements can work together to achieve significant results in the
country’s best interests,” and that “the transition in Tunisia shows
that civil society institutions and organizations can play a crucial role
in a country’s democratization.”270 This last point is worth
reiterating, as despite the involvement of the country’s highest
political leaders, it was ultimately a group of four civil society
organizations that played the biggest role in the country’s successful
democratic transition. More broadly, this intensely political process,
which carried the ultimate aim of facilitating the passage of the
country’s constitution, further emphasizes just how closely related
politics and law are in revolutionary moments. Indeed, the border
between politics and law is typically very porous during these
moments, and while citizens and civil society are certainly not
infallible—and in some cases can even hinder democratic
transformation271—when working together, they can bridge this gap
and resolve what first seem to be irreconcilable differences.
3.

Legal Outcomes

Despite the concerns that many commentators raised, women’s
rights were not only maintained, but ultimately expanded following
the revolution.272 This expansion of rights is evident throughout
Tunisia’s post-revolution legal system. Within this system, four legal
acts provide the greatest contribution to this result: (1) preserving the
progressive Personal Status Code; (2) drafting and implementing a
groundbreaking electoral law; (3) a post-revolution constitution
enshrining gender equality; and (4) the government’s decision to

268.
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270.
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withdraw its reservations to CEDAW.273 This section examines each
of these outcomes.
a.

Preserving the Personal Status Code

As discussed above, Tunisia’s Personal Status Code (PSC), which
addresses family law, children’s rights, and inheritance, among other
legal areas, provides the strongest legal statement of women’s rights
in any Arab or Muslim-majority state. And, as Suad Joseph notes,
family law codes remain “a benchmark of the feminist struggle” in
the Arab and Muslim-majority world.274
Accordingly, the
importance of this code to women’s rights leaders and activists, both
in Tunisia and throughout the MENA region, is difficult to
understate.
The symbolic importance of this code, as well as the substantive
rights that it provides, helps to explain why Tunisian feminists,
secular and Islamist, voiced serious concerns over possible alterations
after Ennahda won the majority of parliamentary seats in the 2011
election.275 Historically, Ennahda had opposed expanding women’s
rights when it viewed these legal acts as inconsistent with Islamic
legal principles.276 Thus, Ennahda strongly criticized President
Bourguiba’s strengthening of the PSC in 1985, which provided
Tunisian women additional legal rights and demanded a public
referendum on this matter.277 However, the party changed course,
and by 1990, it had accepted the PSC.278 More recently, Ennahda
had openly supported the Code and pledged that it would not seek to
change it.279 As Alexander notes, Ennahda has repeatedly shown its
support for women’s rights by stating its respect for the PSC,
supporting expanded opportunities for women, eliminating workplace
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harassment, and calling for women to decide whether they want to
wear the veil (hijab).280
While feminists’ long-standing mistrust of Ennahda’s position
toward women’s rights did not always reflect the party’s evolving
views, the feeling that Ennahda would reverse course and seek to
undo these legal rights proved difficult for the party to overcome.281
Many foreign commentators echoed these concerns.282 Further, while
most foreign commentators offered reasonable perspectives on the
need for Ennahda to preserve the strong legal rights found within this
Code, some commentators made unhelpful ideological arguments that
dismissed Ennahda before it even began to govern.283 Because of this
combination of domestic and international attention, safeguarding the
progressive nature of the PSC became a key priority of feminists
within the MENA region and from further afield.
Ultimately, this concern proved to be something of a moot point, as
Ennahda did not attempt to alter the PSC during its governance of
Tunisia. Whether the party did not attempt to alter the Code due to
domestic political opposition or a longer-term strategy of social and
political change remains debatable. Regardless, more than six years
after the revolution, Ennahda does not seem to have much, if any,
desire to alter the PSC. Indeed, like Tunisia’s other major political
parties, Ennahda has focused on economic and security issues, rather
than broader social and cultural points, as Tunisia’s poor economic
performance and growing security threats now dominate political
debate.284
While the preservation of the Personal Status Code was a crucial
outcome for upholding women’s rights in Tunisia, it is important to
remember that the Code is imperfect.285 Inheritance remains the most
280.
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See, e.g., Daniel Pipes, Opinion, PIPES: Turmoil in Tunisia, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 17,
2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jan/17/turmoil-in-tunisia/
(stating that Islamism constitutes “the civilized world’s greatest enemy” and calling
for allies of the United States to “fight this blight”).
See, e.g., Hiba Safi, Libya or Tunisia: Who Needs the Other More?, CIPE
DEVELOPMENT BLOG (Apr. 17, 1015), http://www.cipe.org/blog/2015/04/17/libya-ortunisia-who-needs-the-other-more/#.V98J4DuBJbk (describing the economic and
security consequences of the ongoing Libyan conflict on Tunisia).
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(Apr. 30, 2014, 11:55 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/30/tunisia-landmark-
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glaring legal inequality between women and men within the Code, as
women still generally receive half the inheritance that men receive.286
In addition, restrictions on women’s rights after divorce and
remarriage are also problematic. For example, Article 58 prohibits a
mother from allowing her children to live with her after she
remarries, even though this same prohibition does not apply to
fathers.287 Thus, even though the PSC remains an undisputedly
important contribution to advancing women’s rights in the MENA
region, even this landmark Code contains provisions that frustrate full
gender equality.
b.

Electoral law

While debate over the PSC centered on maintaining women’s
rights, the 2011 electoral law established new women’s rights with
the intent of making the Tunisian government more gender
representative.288 This law “established full parity and compulsory
alternation of male and female candidates” for the October 2011
Constituent Assembly elections.289 In essence, this “extremely
progressive” law required political parties “to make women at least
half of their candidates.”290
Unfortunately, the gender inclusive intent of this law and its
importance to women’s rights was undermined by the overwhelming
tendency of political parties to list male candidates first on electoral
lists. Indeed, political parties listed male candidates first 94 percent
of the time.291 Despite this undermining tactic, female candidates
still performed well and won a significant number of seats within the
assembly. In total, women won 59 of 271 seats, 27.2 percent of the
National Constituent Assembly.292 In comparison, women hold 19.5
percent of the seats in the U.S. House of Representatives and 20.0

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

291.
292.

action-womens-rights (“The personal status code still makes women second-class
citizens in their families and this needs to change.”).
See id.
Id.
Women’s Learning P’ship, supra note 233 (stating that the interim government
passed this law on April 11, 2011).
Id.
Marks, supra note 279 (noting that despite concerns over its “double discourse” on
women’s rights, Ennahda fielded more female candidates than any other political
party and therefore strongly supported this law, even if only for strategic reasons);
see also Alexander, supra note 108, at 45 (noting that Ennahda was one of the first
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percent of seats in the U.S. Senate, making up 19.6 percent of the
entire U.S. Congress293
c.

The post-revolution constitution

Writing a new constitution quickly became a shared goal of many
political actors and activists after President Ben Ali fled the country
and resigned from office on January 14, 2011.294 After some initial
turmoil, on March 3, 2011 the interim government announced that an
election for the Constituent Assembly would take place on October
23, 2011.295 Ennahda won the majority of seats and formed a
comfortable plurality with the Congress for the Republic and
Ettakatol parties, claiming 139 of 217 seats.296 The assembly’s
responsibilities included creating a new constitution for postrevolution Tunisia. Following the Constituent Assembly elections,
Ennahda leader Rachid Ghannouchi stated that the party would honor
its commitment to produce a new constitution within one year.297
From the outset of these elections, the assembly’s efforts to draft a
constitution and transition Tunisia into a democratic state received
significant attention both in the MENA region and more broadly.298
Of course, drafting and adopting this constitution took much longer
than the expected one year, as political crisis engulfed the country
between July and December 2013.299 Only after the timely
intervention by the National Quartet and an additional fifteen months
of negotiation did the country finally adopt a new constitution on
January 26, 2014. Despite the dark moments where Tunisia appeared
closer to chaos and civil war than security and a democratic

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

299.

Ctr. for Women and Am. Politics, Women in the U.S. Congress 2016, RUTGERS
UNIV., EAGLETON INST. OF POLITICS, http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/women-uscongress-2016 (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
Tunisia’s Election Winners Form Interim Government After Uprising, supra note
128.
Tunisian Coalition Government ‘In 10 Days,’ AL JAZEERA (Oct. 28, 2011),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/10/2011102810143529175.html.
Tunisia’s Election Winners Form Interim Government After Uprising, supra note
128 (“As the country that set off the wave of pro-democracy movements that
engulfed the Arab region, Tunisia’s efforts to build a democracy are being closely
watched around the world.”).
Int’l Crisis Grp., The Tunisian Exception: Success and Limits of Consensus (June 5,
2014), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/northafrica/tunisia/b037-l-exception-tunisienne-succes-et-limites-du-consensus.aspx
(stating that this crisis had two possible outcomes: consensus or violence).

324

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 46

transition, the adoption of the constitution signaled to many that
compromise prevailed over division.300
Indeed, political compromise, particularly by Ennahda, became the
focal point of the praise that Tunisia’s political class received after
the adoption of the constitution. For example, Daoud found that
Ghannouchi yielded to political pressure and “in the name of the
national interest embraced a policy of dialogue.”301 Likewise,
Ennahda leadership also recognized that drafting and adopting a new
constitution served a crucial need for the party’s long-term
objectives.302 Thus, Netterstrøm notes that while Ennahda sought to
leave “as large and deep an Islamist imprint” on the new constitution
as possible, compromise was always its first priority.303
Although commentators generally praised Ennahda for its
compromise over the constitution, questions of motive and hidden
agendas also surfaced.304 These questions arose in large part over the
party’s acceptance of secular legal values over Islamic legal and
social norms within the constitution. Ennahda showed a pragmatic
attitude by accepting these preferences, but it also needed to assuage
its core supporters that the party was not compromising its Islamist
identity. To do so, it offered Islamic legal interpretations that
supported the concessions the party made during the constitutional
drafting process.305 Thus, Netterstrøm concludes that, for Ennahda,
“political calculation not only trumps religious doctrine, but
determines the very interpretation of religion itself.”306 In contrast,
Marks argues that Ennahda’s greatest constitutional concern did not
pertain to religious values, but to the structure of the government.307
Given the oppression that the party endured under Tunisia’s two
strongman presidents, Ennahda most opposed a strong presidential
model of governance, fearing that this model could devolve into
authoritarianism.308 According to Marks, the party ceded more
ground on this point than any other issue.309
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Despite the long and complex negotiations this constitutional
drafting process required, the result was one of nearly unequivocal
praise. As writer and cultural critic Shajahan Madampat states: Of all
the Arab countries, “Tunisia has arguably the most progressive, most
secular and least misogynistic constitution, approved nearconsensually last year.”310 Likewise, Marks notes that Tunisia’s
2014 Constitution was “the first constitution freely created by a
representative, democratically elected assembly anywhere in the
Arabic-speaking world.”311 Still, other commentators caution against
overemphasizing the importance of the constitution at the expense of
overshadowing other key reforms. For example, Nadia Marzouki
remarks that “[t]he collective fixation on the constitution and the
subsequent elections had a downside . . . [since] [i]t sidelined three
subjects—the renewal of the political field, legislative reform and
transitional justice—that were just as important to the transition.”312
From a women’s rights perspective, the most important legal
outcomes in the new constitution are the decisions not to include a
reference to shari‘a and to include an article that establishes the
state’s role in protecting and strengthening women’s rights, while
also recognizing gender equality. The debate over including a shari‘a
clause—even a symbolic reference—became protracted and at times
contentious, both between secular and Islamist actors and within
Ennahda, by far the country’s most significant Islamist party.313
Ultimately, Ennahda relented on this point, but justified its decision
to do so on Islamic legal principles and not political calculations.314
The inclusion of gender equality, as opposed to the more familiar
concept of gender complementarity found within many other
constitutions in Arab and Muslim-majority states, was a key point for
feminists. Ennahda also figured prominently in this debate, first
creating a firestorm of criticism for its initial mishandling of this
issue before quickly retracting this position and supporting full
gender equality.
i.

Shari‘a

Secular political parties quickly rejected including a reference to
shari‘a within the constitution, but Ennahda engaged in a protracted
internal debate over the importance of including a clause or article
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
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referencing shari‘a.315 Some secular politicians, such as Mohsen
Marzouk of the Nidaa Tounes party, rejected these deliberations as
unnecessary, arguing that the 1959 Constitution’s omission of shari‘a
was “perfectly fine,” and that this debate was simply a strategic tactic
to gain time.316 Likewise, some academic commentators exhorted
“emerging democracies,” such as Tunisia, to frame their “new
national identities” on “unqualified grants of religious freedoms as
well as specifically enumerated human rights consistent with
international law.”317
Although well-intentioned, such calls ignore Tunisia’s pluralist past
and that the denial of religious freedoms and human rights stemmed
not from Islamist groups or an inadequate constitution, but almost
entirely from Tunisia’s authoritarian secular governments. Indeed,
statements such as, “[c]hanging the text of a constitution will not
immediately change a culture, but it can guide it in future generations
as legislatures and courts look to their founding documents in
interpreting the laws,” read at best as naïve, as this statement
minimizes the responsibility of previous governments for past
injustices and overlooks the country’s rich legal tradition.318
Furthermore, it is debatable what legal effect, if any, a nonbinding
reference to shari‘a would have had on the constitution, particularly
since Ennahda identified with a tolerant and progressive version of
shari‘a.319 As Marks notes, Ennahda leader Rachid Ghannouchi
rejected rigid legal codes and argued for a progressive interpretation
of shari‘a that focused “on more expansive notions of Islamic ethics,
including social justice, equality between persons, and the like.”320
Ennahda eventually relented on “the sharia question,” although the
more conservative party members have expressed concerns that this
concession goes too far.321 Nonetheless, Tunisia’s post-revolutionary
constitution defines Tunisia as a civil state, and while it references
the teachings of Islam, it does not reference shari‘a.322 Even more
surprisingly, “the constitution grants the right to ‘freedom of
conscience and belief,’” the latter, according to one scholar,
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
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represents a “truly revolutionary” legal principle within the Arab
world.323
ii.

Gender equality

Like the inclusion of an article or clause referencing shari‘a, the
issue of gender created a rift between Ennahda and secular political
parties. Article 22 of the first draft of the constitution affirmed the
equality of all citizens, but Article 28 provided for complementarity
between men and women.324 Critics seized on this point to argue that
Ennahda intended to undermine women’s rights, just as they had
warned.325 A “firestorm of criticism” ensued, which was exacerbated
by uncritical reporting by foreign journalists who understood Article
28 to mean that women served as “men’s complements,” whereas the
article actually stated that “[men and women’s] roles complement
one another within the family.”326
Ennahda quickly retracted this article, and likely did not intend to
produce the gender inequality that this clause could have caused, but
as Marks notes, this gaffe occurred at a terrible time and resulted in a
missed opportunity for Ennahda to build trust on a crucial issue.327
As she states: “Many of Ennahda’s fiercest opponents—already
fearful that the party would scale back critical pieces of women’s
rights legislation—felt they had seen the party’s true colors, and
vowed to fight even harder against Ennahda.”328 The controversy
that this article created was hardly the only contentious issue to the
first draft of Tunisia’s post-revolution constitution, which the drafters
released in Arabic on August 8, 2012.329 Nonetheless, it proved to be
a persistent obstacle to the drafters and was only resolved through
several subsequent revisions.
In contrast, Tunisia’s post-revolution constitution, finally adopted
on January 26, 2014, provided strong protections for women’s rights
and a guarantee of gender equality.330 Article 46, which details these
protections, contains the following four provisions:
1. The state commits to protect women’s accrued rights
and work to strengthen and develop those rights.
323.
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2. The state guarantees the equality of opportunities
between women and men to have access to all levels of
responsibility in all domains.
3. The state works to attain parity between women and
men in elected Assemblies.
4. The state shall take all necessary measures in order to
eradicate violence against women.331
Human Rights Watch was one of several prominent human rights
organizations to praise the constitution’s inclusion of strong women’s
rights, stating: “[The constitution] makes Tunisia one of the few
countries in the Middle East and North Africa region with a
constitutional obligation to work toward gender parity in elected
Likewise, Marks notes that the constitution’s
assemblies.”332
inclusion of gender parity was a “first . . . in the Arab world.”333
Although many commentators expressed surprise that Ennahda
would agree to such a strong statement of women’s rights within the
constitution, the party’s previous actions suggested that it would be
amenable to this outcome. For example, in 2005, Ennahda “agreed to
a joint platform of demands” that included its commitment to
“multiparty democracy and to the progressive rights that Tunisian
women by then enjoyed.”334 Furthermore, women historically have
played an active role in Ennahda.335 Despite these commitments to
supporting women’s rights, Ennahda has never fully convinced
Tunisian women that it does not harbor ulterior motives, and as
Alexander notes, “[n]o single constituency has expressed greater
concern about Ennahda’s rise than Tunisian women.”336 Moreover,
while the party takes pains to profess its public support of women’s
rights, it also continues to undercut these statements through, at best,
carelessness and insensitivity and, at worst, slippages of a duplicitous
agenda. For example, following the revolution, Ennahda continued
to stress its commitment to maintaining the rights of women, but in
2011 and 2012, high-ranking party officials made several statements
that raised questions over the sincerity of this commitment.337
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Until Ennahda refrains from these lapses of trust, it will not
convince Tunisian women of its genuine commitment toward
establishing and maintaining women’s rights.
Still, despite
predictions of obstruction or worse, Ennahda supported the new
constitution even though it enshrined many principles that the party
had previously opposed.338 Accordingly, Ennahda has rebuked its
critics, at least for the time being.
d.

Withdrawing reservations to CEDAW

Throughout the MENA region, women’s rights activists recognize
CEDAW as a critical tool for pressuring governments to advance
women’s rights.339 Indeed, this landmark treaty defines what
constitutes discrimination against women and establishes minimum
steps that countries must take to end such discrimination. Although
many MENA and Muslim majority countries have signed CEDAW,
they typically did so while making significant reservations and
declarations to offset treaty provisions perceived to conflict with
Islamic law, thereby undermining the intent of the treaty.340 Tunisia
offers a case in point. Under President Bourguiba, Tunisia ratified
CEDAW on September 20, 1985, but also made a declaration to
Article 15(4) and reservations to Articles 9(2), 16(c), (d), (f), (g), (h),
and 29(1).341
Feminists and women’s rights organizations fought to remove the
declarations and reservations that Bourguiba made and advocated for
better implementation of CEDAW during Bourguiba’s rule and Ben
Ali’s subsequent reign. Given the repressive political atmosphere
and constraints on civil society, these efforts often ended in
frustration and impasse. The Tunisian Revolution injected these
efforts with new hope, as the stunning speed of political change
suggested that a window for meaningful progressive change had
opened. To capitalize on this opportunity, women’s rights activists
and feminists from across the region met in Morocco in May 2011 to
find the best strategy for achieving full implementation of CEDAW,
338.
339.
340.
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particularly as several countries began political transitions following
the Arab Spring.342
A few months after this important meeting, the Tunisian Council of
Ministers adopted a draft decree to lift the country’s CEDAW
reservations on August 16, 2011.343 The transitional government
adopted this decree into law on October 24, 2011, publishing DecreeLaw 103 in the country’s official legal journal.344 However, the
newly elected government did not send the withdrawal notification to
the U.N. Secretary-General, who acts as the depository of the
convention.345 Under international law, this lack of notification
meant that this Act had no legal effect at the international level, and
the declaration and reservations remained in effect.346 It was not until
April 17, 2014—more than two and a half years later—that Tunisia
officially withdrew its reservations to the CEDAW, thereby binding
itself to making the legal changes necessary to support this
decision.347 Again, women’s rights organizations and civil society
helped to secure this outcome through persistent campaigning and
advocacy efforts.348
The Tunisian reservations to CEDAW had primarily concerned
gender equality issues in family matters. Lifting these reservations
provided women stronger rights inside and outside the family,
including (1) confirming a woman’s ability to pass her nationality
onto her children; (2) clarifying rights and responsibilities in
marriage and divorce, as well as matters relating to children and
guardianship; (3) demarcating personal rights for husbands and wives
with regard to family name and occupation; and (4) affirming the
same rights applied to both husband and wife in ownership of
342.
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property.349
Numerous human rights organizations noted the
importance of withdrawing these reservations. For example, Human
Rights Watch called this Act “an important step toward realizing
gender equality.”350 Likewise, women’s rights researcher Rothna
Begum stated: “The Tunisian government, by lifting major
reservations to CEDAW, is proclaiming its commitment to advance
women’s rights.”351
Although human rights organizations rightfully noted the
importance of this decision, they also urged Tunisia to do more than
simply drop its CEDAW reservations.352 Without meaningful
implementation, this decision will have little practical effect for
advancing women’s rights. Likewise, Tunisia remains one of the
relatively few African Union member states that has not signed the
protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the
Rights of Women in Africa, commonly referred to as the Maputo
Protocol.353 This important legislation provides additional rights to
CEDAW and helps to counter longstanding critiques of human rights
as an inherently “Western” project.354
Academic debate over whether human rights are “Western” or
“universal” are both relentlessly cyclical and of little substantive
value to those most in need of stronger human rights. In addition,
debates over human rights treaties such as CEDAW often do not
resonate with Muslim women. As Islamic feminist and human rights
activist Zainah Anwar notes, a human rights framework will not have
meaningful significance to many Muslim women, especially within
rural areas, such as the villages within Anwar’s native Malaysia.355
Instead, Islamic law and religious matters matter most to women.
Thus, she concludes:
Invoking CEDAW is not enough to convince these women
of their rights, because it has no resonance to them. Islam,
on the other hand, is a source of values and principles. We
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

354.
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on the Rights of Women in Africa, AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’
RIGHTS, http://www.achpr.org/instruments/women-protocol/ (click “Ratification
Table” link) (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
See, e.g., Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab, Human Rights: A Western Construct
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needed to engage with religion and provide answers to these
questions in ways that were relevant to their lives.356
V. CONCLUSION
The Arab Spring uprisings remind us that revolutions are periods of
immense uncertainty, providing moments of great hope as well as
moments of great despair. The outcomes that followed the Arab
Spring also remind us that positive change is not inevitable and that
authoritarian leaders often reassert themselves rather than give way to
democratic change. Revolutions can lead to peaceful transitions and
an inclusive reimagining of the state and its institutions—effectively
a reordering of society—or they can result in terrible violence and
protracted conflict and instability.357 While the Arab Spring
produced outcomes on both ends of this spectrum, the mostly
discouraging results offer a blunt reminder that not all popular
uprisings will succeed and that authoritarian rule seldom goes away
quietly.
Although the Tunisian Revolution ultimately produced a
democratic government based on the rule of law and a progressive
constitution, this result was anything but certain. Indeed, such an
outcome seemed all but impossible during the darkest days of the
transition when the country teetered on the brink of armed conflict
and political collapse.358 Women’s rights followed a similar
trajectory and reached a similar result, as feminists and women’s
rights activists eventually succeeded in not only maintaining, but also
strengthening women’s rights in post-revolution Tunisia. Likewise,
this outcome was not assured and required the persistence and
commitment of numerous individuals and organizations to secure
these advances.
To achieve this outcome, women’s rights leaders drew on the
progressive legal history of Tunisia, while also deftly negotiating the
tension that came from previously suppressed conservative Islamist
groups. Feminists and women’s rights activists suddenly found
themselves defending Tunisia’s progressive women’s rights in
political debate and public discourse without the backing of an
authoritarian government that simply denied this challenging, and at
times, even confrontational perspective.359 That women’s rights
advocates succeeded in maintaining the progressive Personal Status
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359.
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Code, passing a groundbreaking electoral law, including gender
equality within the constitution, and overseeing the government
withdraw its declaration and reservations to CEDAW shows the
broad acceptance of strong women’s rights within Tunisia.
Whether Tunisia’s approach to expanding women’s rights could
succeed in other Islamic or Muslim-majority states remains a
contested debate. However, Tunisian exceptionalism suggests that
this approach is not easily repeatable. Indeed, the strong legal
protections and progressive legal system that Tunisian women have
enjoyed for decades as well as the political dominance of an Islamist
party as progressive and as willing to compromise as Ennahda make
this approach difficult to replicate.360 Thus, Tunisia is an outlier both
to the rest of the Arab Spring uprisings and to women’s rights in the
MENA region.361 While Tunisia represents a successful outcome and
perhaps a motivating example for women’s rights activists to
consider, these actors should ground their efforts for legal and
political reform in their histories and cultures. In this sense, Tunisian
women’s rights should serve more as an approach than as a blueprint
in the struggle for advancing women’s rights and achieving gender
equality in the MENA region and beyond.
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